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Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. The author would
like to thank Donna Blanton, Larry George, and Marleen O'Connor for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts. Frank Brooks, Patricia Matthews, and
Heather Lindsay provided valuable research assistance.
1. Nat Stern, Circumventing Lax Fiduciary Standards: The Possibility of Share-
holder Multistate Class Actions for Directors'Breach of the Duty of Care, 72 NEB.
L. REV. 1 (1993).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
resident shareholders could personally recover for damages caused by
directors' negligence in connection with a major transaction.2 Should
a number of states adopt the statute, the proposal contemplates a mul-
tistate class action in which a court would apply the law of each state
in which a shareholder resides and assign damages accordingly. The
earlier piece sought to anticipate and overcome potential objections
grounded in constitutional principles and choice-of-law doctrine.
Questions regarding the workability and desirability of the statute
were left for later exploration. This article addresses some of those
questions.
Part I seeks to demonstrate that notwithstanding plausible proce-
dural concerns, the shareholder multistate class action envisioned by
the statute could be managed by the courts. Even if the reach of a
state's fiduciary standard were thus extended, however, the duty of
care has traditionally been regarded as placing only slight demands on
directors' conduct. Therefore, Part II attempts to show how the direc-
tors' obligation to exercise due care could be reconceived as a potent
instrument for vindicating shareholders' interests. Finally, since the
proposed statute clashes with the contract model of the corporation
popular among current commentators, Part III raises and responds to
objections that could be brought under the contractual conception.
The article concludes that neither these objections, the conventionally
limited scope of directors' duty of care, nor the procedural hurdles of
class actions should stand in the way of a legislature seeking to estab-
lish locally enforceable duties toward injured resident investors.
I. THE FEASIBILITY OF CLASS ACTIONS
The shareholder multistate class action raises a number of practi-
cal questions of administration. These include difficulty in ascertain-
ing appropriate occasions for bringing suit in this form, accurately
identifying the adversely affected class, and ensuring the fair and
binding application of the laws of several states. Nevertheless, this
type of suit appears to be the most effective means by which a state
may protect resident shareholders without encroaching on the prerog-
atives of the incorporating state.
A. Advantages of the Class Device and Conditions for Class Certification
Admittedly, whether a claim should be brought in a direct or deriv-
ative action is not always readily apparent.3 Derivative suits are
brought to redress "a wrong to the incorporated group as a whole that
depletes or destroys corporate assets and reduces the value of the cor-
2. See id at 807-11.
3. See Abelow v.-Symonds, 156 A.2d 416, 420 (Del. Ch. 1959)(distinction between
derivative and personal causes of action "often a narrow one").
[Vol. 72:905
DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
poration's stock."4 To state an individual claim, a shareholder "must
allege either 'an injury which is separate and distinct from that suf-
fered by other shareholders,' or a wrong involving a contractual right
of a shareholder... which exists independently of any right of the
corporation."5 Obvious instances of injuries suffered by shareholders
qua shareholders include interference with voting rights,6 the fraudu-
lent inducement of the sale of stock,7 and impairment of the plaintiff's
relative position among shareholders.8 On the other hand, allegations
of corporate mismanagement9 and of diversion of funds in connection
with a cash-out merger'o have been held to present only derivative
claims. Among the most clear-cut occasions for direct actions are
those in which one formally denominated class of shareholders is pit-
ted against another" or those in which the directors are charged with
failing to provide adequate disclosure.1 2 Other claims, such as allega-
tions that directors have sold their corporate officesl 3 or improperly
4. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1188 n.10 (Del. 1988)(citation
omitted).
5. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.), qffd, 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985)(quoting FLrrER'S CYcLOPEDIA CORPS. § 5921, at 451 (1984)).
6. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlar Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. Ch. 1988); Reifsnyder v.
Pittsburgh Advertising Co., 173 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. 1961)(suit against majority
shareholder).
7. Von Au v. Mangenheimer, 110 N.Y.S. 629, 635-37 (App. Div. 1908) csff'd, 89 N.E.
1114 (1909). See also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1188-89 (Del.
1988) (allegation of fraud in appraisal proceeding).
8. Borak v. J.I. Case, 317 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1963), affd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Horowitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 99, 101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Sheppard v. Wilcox,
26 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Bennett v. Brevil Petroleum
Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 240 (Del. Ch. 1953).
9. Downey v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Mass. 1982).
10. Kramer v. Western Pac. Indus. Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 349 (Del. 1988).
1U. In Zahn v. Transamerica, 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947), for example, Class A stock-
holders challenged the forced redemption of their stock. The redemption was
issued at the behest of the Class B stockholder, and excluded the Class A stock-
holders from participation in the lucrative liquidation of a subsidiary. Id- at 38-40.
Although the suit was successfully maintained against the Class B stockholder,
"[w]ithout doubt, the directors also would have been liable to the shareholders."
Carter, infra note 25, at 833. See also Phillips v. Insituform of North America,
Inc., 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 774 (Del. Ch. 1987)(board reduced proportion of Class B
shares held by the plaintiffs to 49% by authoring the sale of additional shares,
approved by-law changes increasing the power of Class A shareholders, and took
other actions designed to prevent plaintiffs from controlling the corporation).
12. See Bresson v. Thomson McKinnon Sec. Inc., 118 F.R.D. 339,342 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Notteringham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089,1091 (Del. 1989); In re Shoe-Town,
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9483,1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12,1988);
Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1060 (Del. Ch. 1987); In re
Anderson, Clayton Shareholders' Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 678-89 (Del. Ch. 1986).
13. Compare Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955), cert denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955)(minority shareholder may recover directly from majority share-
holder for premium received for sale of controlling shares) with Haberman v.
Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1314 (2nd Cir. 1972)(portion of price received that is
1993]
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withheld the declaration of dividends,14 have divided the courts over
the nature of the suit.
In most instances, the characterization of claims brought under the
proposed statute as direct actions should arouse little dispute. Allega-
tions of director negligence in connection with a change in control of
the corporation typically involve a decline in the value of the plain-
tiffs' shares that can be distinguished from harm to the corporation
itself; the plaintiffs have suffered a distinct injury not shared by
outside creditors of the corporation. It is well-settled, for example,
that attacks on the terms of a merger may be brought by shareholders
in their own right.15
Unlike a derivative suit, the shareholder multistate class action
does not necessarily displace the lex incorporationis. A class action
would apply the fiduciary standard of each enacting state to the extent
of that state's interest in the action, as measured by the shares held by
residents of the state. By contrast, the derivative suit seeks to vindi-
cate the unified interest of a single entity: the corporation itself.16 For
that reason, the variation in claims and apportionment of damages
found in class actions are not available in a derivative suit. The uni-
tary character of derivative actions dictates that application of a law
other than the lex incorporationis and in a derivative suit entails re-
jection of the law of the incorporating state. Besides representing a
departure from the internal affairs doctrine,17 this course would not
offer a principled basis for determining the state whose law would
govern the suit. In theory, this problem could be overcome by bring-
ing a series of actions. However, the firmly entrenched rule of res
judicata in derivative suitsl 8 -stenuning not only from the conceptual
attributable to the sale of a corporate office is recoverable by the corporation).
See Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652, 655 (E.D. Wis. 1968)(same); Borak v. J.I.
Case Co., 317 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1963), affd 337 U.S. 426 (1964)(sale of corpo-
rate office violating fiduciary duties owed to both the corporation and to
shareholders).
14. Compare Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1954)(suit to compel payment
of dividends asserting right of corporation) with Knapp v. Bankers Securities
Corp., 230 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1956)(shareholders can bring direct action).
15. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); In re
Mobile Communications Corp. of America, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,897
(Del. Ch. 1991); In re Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Shareholders Litig., 1990
LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch.); Rand v. Western Airlines, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,751 (Del. Ch. 1989).
16. See Note, Distinguishing Between Direct and Derivative Shareholder Suits, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1148 (1962).
17. The doctrine provides that issues arising out of internal corporate relationships
are governed by the law of the state of incorporation. See P. John Kozyris, Corpo-
rate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1, 15.
18. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 998-99 (N.Y. 1979). See Debra Pulenskey
Drescher, Note, The Effect of Res Judicata on Shareholder Derivative Actions in
[Vol. 72:905
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unity of the corporate personality, but also from the burdens and
harms that successive suits would produce' 9 -effectively compels the
selection of one state law.
Class actions also enable plaintiff shareholders to avoid the proce-
dural obstacles to derivative suits erected by numerous states. For ex-
ample, compliance with the law of the state of incorporation might
require the plaintiff to make demand on the corporation's directors2O
or shareholders2l before initiating a derivative suit. A potentially
more onerous requirement is the posting of security for expenses that
may be incurred by directors in defending against a derivative ac-
tion.22 Even more drastically, the authority vested in special litigation
committees by some states' laws23 may cause a derivative action to be
terminated altogether.24
While thus offering procedural advantages to plaintiffs, the pro-
posed statute's provision for direct actions benefits directors as well by
limiting their exposure to liability. Unlike derivative suits, which may
spring from allegations of any harm done to the corporation, direct
New York. Parkoff v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp. 47 ALBANY L. REv.
145 (1981). But see Note, Res Judicata in the Derivative Action: Adequacy of Rep-
resentation and the Inadequate Plaintiff, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1042 (1973)(proposing
exceptions to rule).
19. See Note, supra note 18, at 160.
20. See Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1170-71 (7th Cir.
1989)(demand requirement governed by law of state of incorporation); Cottle v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1094, 1097-98 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v.
Gerena, 116 F.R.D. 596, 604 (D. Conn. 1987). See also Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs. Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
21. See Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir. 1987); Burt v.
Danforth, 742 F. Supp. 1043, 1048-49 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986).
23. See Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 548 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (N.D. Ohio
1982), vacated on other grounds, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984).
24. On the other hand, statutory provisions for liberal indemnification of directors
defending direct actions may render a successful class action a Pyrrhic victory.
That is, shareholders' gain in compensation for their losses may be offset by the
decline in the value of their stock as the corporate fisc is drained by payments to
the directors or to the indemnifying insurance company. See Dale A. Oesterle,
Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and Officers from Personal
Liability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513, 573-74. However, the possibility of indemnifica-
tion does not destroy the value of class actions for the violation of the duty of due
care. When the class comprises fewer than all shareholders-as would occur
where directors are liable only under the more stringent standard of some
states-the recovery by the benefited shareholders would outweigh the diminu-
tion of their stake in the corporation. Even where all shareholders are potential
beneficiaries, they may consider the award of present cash compensation suffi-
ciently valuable to justify a class action. In contrast, the recovery in a successful
derivative suit is assigned to the corporate treasury, where stockholders must
share it with others who have claims on the corporation. If indemnification is
allowed, then the derivative suit has been futile, for the corporation is simply
returning to directors money that it has just extracted from them.
1993]
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actions must assert the violation of a duty owed specifically to share-
holders. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to acknowledge the
existence of such duties except in carefully limited circumstances.2 5
By confining its scope to direct actions, the proposed statute substan-
tially reduces the likelihood of unleashing a flood of litigated chal-
lenges to directors' conduct.
The principal context in which courts have been willing to enter-
tain direct actions-changes in control of the corporation-is the focus
of the proposed statute. It is on this battleground that shareholders
are most likely to mobilize as a class26 (though often unsuccessfully on
the merits27) to enforce obligations owed directly to them. Since chal-
lenges to shifts in control frequently allege prejudice to the interests
of minority shareholders,28 these claims are especially suitable for
class treatment.
Nevertheless, enactment of the proposed statute might provoke
25. See generally John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 823 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. 781 F.2d 264 (2nd Cir.
1986)(violation of due care in board's approval of lock-up option agreement); Rev-
lon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)(de-
fensive measures taken by board to avert hostile takeover did not meet directors'
fiduciary duties to shareholders); In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig. 1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 14 (allegation in class action that directors failed to inform them-
selves or sufficiently participate in negotiations leading to "going private" trans-
action stated cause of action for which relief could be granted).
27. See, e.g., Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)(allegation by several shareholders of directors' failure to inform them-
selves adequately before accepting offer to buy the corporation); In re Vitalink
Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,585
(Del. Ch. 1991)(challenge to settlement in class action based on alleged breach of
duty of care and of candor); In re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,408 (Del. 1990)(class action challenging terms of squeeze-out
merger); Norberg v. Young's Mkt. Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,468 (Del. Ch.
1989)(class action seeking injunction to bar merger taking corporation private on
grounds of directors' alleged violation of duties of loyalty and due care); Yanow v.
Scientific Leasing, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,660 (Del. Ch. 1988), sum.
judgment granted, dismissed, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 96,189 (Del. Ch.
1991)(shareholders' motion to enjoin cash tender offer on basis of directors' al-
leged breach of duties of due care and/or loyalty in approving offer).
28. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969)(suit against ma-
jority shareholder); Sheppard v. Wilcox, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (DCA 2 1962); In re
Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig. Appeals, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,408 (Del.
1990); Notteringham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089 (Del. 1989); Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 429 A.2d 497 (suit against majority
shareholder), overruled on other grounds by Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983); Kumar v. Racing Corp. of America, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,896 (Del. Ch. 1991) Van De Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,834 (Del. Ch. 1991); Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.
1974), affd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Abelow v. Symonds, 156 A.2d 416 (Del. Ch.
1959).
DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
states with a different philosophy of fiduciary duties to create obsta-
cles to class certification. A state that has attracted substantial incor-
poration-Delaware being the most notable example-could attempt
to preclude suits under the statute by adopting an exceedingly narrow
conception of direct actions. Under the traditional rule that the lex
incorporationis determines whether an action is direct or derivative,29
potential plaintiffs would be deprived of the class vehicle that is cen-
tral to the statute. However, the same interests that entitle a state to
follow its own substantive notions of fiduciary duties30 also justify its
disregard of artificial doctrines designed to thwart the advancement of
those interests. Otherwise, a state of incorporation could defeat most
outreach provisions simply by erecting insurmountable procedural
barriers in areas of traditional deference to the lex incorporationis.
Perhaps recognizing this danger, a New York court has indicated that
it could grant class certification to shareholders of a Delaware corpo-
ration in a suit before it even if Delaware law would not.31
A more serious set of concerns arises from the potential heteroge-
neity of the class of shareholders bringing suit under the proposed
statute. Since various states may impose disparate fiduciary duties, a
court might be required to apply a multiplicity of standards. As a re-
sult, directors might be found liable to residents of some states but not
to others or even subject to varying measures of damages. These di-
vergences appear to be in some tension with class action statutes' de-
mands for uniformity, especially the prerequisites that "questions of
law or fact common to the class" exist and that "the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class."3 2 This type of suit would also clash directly with the Re-
statement's exclusive assignment of suits by dissenting shareholders
to the state of incorporation for the purpose of ensuring "uniformity
in the recoveries" and "equality of treatment." 33
Although concerns about the feasibility of discrete statewide sub-
classes are legitimate, the Supreme Court has already rejected them as
automatic grounds for denying class certification. Phillips Petroleum
v. Shutt34 upheld the authority of a Kansas court to administer a class
29. Hunter v. Old Ben Coal Co., 844 F.2d 428, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1988); Seidel v. Allegis
Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1409, 1410-11 (N.D. Mll. 1989). See Downey v. Vernitron Corp.,
559 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Mass. 1982).
30. See Stern, supra note 1, at 870-72.
31. See Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573 (Sup. Ct. 1990). The
New York suit was brought against New York investment bankers, rather than
the corporation's board, for their allegedly negligent advice concerning an auction
of the corporation. The court stayed the suit because of the possibility that the
outcome of a Delaware action against the board might effectively preempt the
action against the bankers. Id.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 313 comment (c)(1971).
34. 472 U.S. 797 (1985), cert. denied, mandamus denied, 487 U.S. 1223 (1988). For an
1993]
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action arising out of claims in eleven different states35 and presumably
governed by as many different state laws. While the Court did not
grant a blanket imprimatur to all multistate class actions involving
varying state laws, Shutts does signal sympathy for this device where
the alternative is that most of the plaintiffs "would have no realistic
day in court."3 6
Still, it may be argued that sorting a limited number of shareholder
groups, all of whose claims are governed by a single regime, presents a
far more manageable task than discerning and applying the diverse
fiduciary laws of several states. Shutts itself observed that compliance
with constitutional requirements for choice of law would sometimes
be rendered "more difficult or more burdensome" by the "large
number of transactions which the state proposes to adjudicate and
which have little connection to the forum."37 Decisions since Shutts
have based their denial of class certification principally on the difficul-
ties of applying the variety of pertinent state laws.38 In the case of
shareholders' claims for negligence, some courts might feel similarly
ill-equipped to interpret the numerous state laws involved.39 Con-
versely, a forum might eagerly seize upon the liberal jurisdictional
excellent analysis of concerns about multistate class actions left in the aftermath
of Shutts, see Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1
(1986).
35. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985).
36. Id, at 809. Moreover, in resolving disputes over fundamental changes, courts have
already had to distinguish the rights and interests of various groups of sharehold-
ers. Often it has been a simple matter of disqualifying shareholders who benefit-
ted from a challenged transaction from the recovery that may be enjoyed by
those who did not benefit. E.g., Borak v. J.I. Care Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963),
affd, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
349 U.S. 952 (1955); Zahn v. Transamerica, 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). In those
instances, of course, the dissenting shareholders have all stood in the same rela-
tionship to the defendant. Even where plaintiff shareholders have differed in the
nature of their claims, see, e.g., Randle v. Spectran, 129 F.R.D. 386, 391-92 (D.
Mass. 1988), however, or where courts have identified rights peculiar to a limited
segment of stockholders, see Hastings-Mertheh v. Texas Air Corp., 119 F.R.D.
450, 458-59 (S.D. Cal. 1988); In re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig. Appeals, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,408 (Del. 1990) class treatment has been allowed if the
representative shareholders appear able to assert adequately all the claims
presented.
37. 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985).
38. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. J. C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 (11th Cir.), reh'g
denied en banc, 832 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988);
Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 265 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Priest v.
Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552, 557-58 (D. Mass. 1988); Osborne v. Subaru of Am.,
Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
39. See Bresson v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., 118 F.R.D. 339, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(de-
nying class treatment to investors' negligence claims against brokerage firm be-
cause of significant variations in state law).
[Vol. 72:905
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reach conferred by Shutts4o to implement its own policy under the
guise of construing other states' laws;41 the imprecise nature of the
duty of due care may especially lend itself to such distortion.
The problems of difficult or tendentious construction, however, do
not make shareholder multistate class actions for lack of due care in-
herently impractical. Many courts since Shutts have refused to permit
differences in state law to defeat class certification.42 In most key re-
spects, a typical shareholder's claim of negligence resembles the cases
in which certification has been granted more than the cases in which
certification has been denied. In contrast to some products liability
cases where certification has been denied, the conduct that sharehold-
ers complain about springs from a single episode and inflicts the same
type of injury on all of the plaintiffs.43 Likewise, the common nature
of the shareholders' allegations is mirrored by the centrality of the
directors' defense, a factor that weighs heavily in the class certification
decision.44
Moreover, the substantial variation in state laws which has de-
terred certification in some cases would probably not occur among
outreach fiduciary statutes. States that chose to protect resident in-
vestors in this manner would inherently share a similar philosophy
about the nature of directors' duty of due care. Accordingly, the stat-
utes could be expected to resemble each other in most or all of their
significant provisions. Indeed, the statutes' conscious purpose of facili-
tating multistate actions would discourage variation in details that
would hinder the ability to bring class suits. To the extent that differ-
40. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-14 (1985).
41. See Miller & Crump, supra note 34, at 61-64.
42. E.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986) and 479 U.S. 915 (1986); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 1991 WL
29457, *2 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Barker v. FSC Sec. Corp., 133 F.R.D. 548, 554-55 (W.D.
Ark. 1990)(burden on defendants to establish material differences among rele-
vant state laws in order to avoid class certification); Longden v. Sunderman, 123
F.R.D. 547,555 (N.D. Tex. 1988)(mere assertion by defendant that there would be
potential differences in elements of fraud among the small number of states in-
volved in the litigation, short of actual showing of substantial variation in law
among states, insufficient to defeat class certification); In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111
F.R.D. 663, 669-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)(difficulties in addressing state claims of vari-
ous plaintiffs too distant and speculative to preclude certification).
43. Compare In re Northern Dist. of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liability
Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983)(class
certification denied where allegedly defective product produced different types of
injuries over period of time) with In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415
(W.D. Mo. 1982)(certifying punitive damage class where all injuries arose from
collapse of portion of building), rev'd on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.
1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); see Miller & Crump, supra note 34, at 44-
46.
44. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
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ences arose, they would probably lie in details that would be suffi-
ciently specific4 5 and ascertainable so that they would not defeat a
court's ability to coordinate and administer all the enacting states'
laws. In addition, choice of law problems that have sometimes mili-
tated against class certification 46 would not present an obstacle be-
cause the statutes themselves would set forth their explicit and
compatible selections of law.
B. The Problem of Res Judicata
Perhaps the most difficult and complex questions raised by Shutts
pertain to the res judicata effect of a judgment in a shareholder class
action. One of the principal underpinnings of res judicata-shielding
the defendant from vexatious lawsuits47-takes on a special focus in
the corporate setting. Subjecting directors to several suits for the
same conduct, perhaps with officers summoned as witnesses, threat-
ens to disrupt corporate operations. 48 If the proposed statute is
adopted by numerous states, disruption might result from competing
or successive shareholder class actions. Shutts does not altogether
preclude this possibility. While the Court endorsed the defendant's
interest in binding the entire plaintiff class by res judicata,49 the opin-
ion did not formulate a firm rule for claim preclusion.0 Ultimately,
however, the special danger of multiple suits posed by shareholder
multistate class actions is probably more theoretical than real.
The first of the troubling but surmountable problems that might
arise from the enactment of several fiduciary statutes is certification
of the same shareholder class by courts in more than one state.51 If no
means could be agreed upon for selecting a single forum for a consoli-
dated suit, then two or more substantially identical actions could pro-
ceed simultaneously. In addition to imposing significant costs and
burdens, this development might provoke a "race to judgment"52
among the competing representatives of the shareholder class. This
type of race would invite tactical maneuvers that aggravate the inher-
ent strains of redundant litigation, as well as retard the truth-seeking
45. The need for notice and administrability would require that an outreach statute
be couched in more specific terms than the ordinary formulation of the director's
duty of due care. See Stern, supra note 1, at 807-11.
46. See e.g., Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 265 (S.D. 1988).
47. See JACK A. FRIEDENTHAL et al., CML PROCEDURE 615 (1985)(most important
purpose of res judicata is to "provide repose for both the party litigants and the
public").
48. See Note, supra note 18, at 1058.
49. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985).
50. See Miller & Crump, supra note 34, at 36.
51. Id. at 23-24.
52. Id. at 24.
[Vol. 72:905
1993] DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
function of the suits.53
Another potential source of duplicative-but not necessarily com-
peting-suits is the opportunity for shareholders to "opt out" of an
action against directors. Shutts appears to grant absent plaintiffs an
unlimited right to opt out of a class action.54 Even if the ruling is con-
fined to actions authorized by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3)55 or a comparable state provision,5 6 an action brought under
the proposed fiduciary statute might fall into that category. Like the
plaintiffs in Shutts, whose common claim of entitlement to interest on
royalty payments was governed by the law of eleven different states,
plaintiff shareholders would rely on a common allegation of negli-
gence which would be resolved by the law of each state where a share-
holder resides.
Conceivably, some shareholders might be tempted to opt out of a
class action in order to improve their chances of recovering in a later
action. By waiting for the outcome of the initial litigation, those
shareholders could gain valuable insight as to the most effective way
to position themselves in a subsequent suit. If the original class action
was successful in establishing directors' liability, the shareholders who
opted out of the class action could support their own claim with that
result. Conversely, if the first suit failed, shareholders who declined
to participate as class members would in theory not be bound by that
judgment.57 With the benefit of observing the weaknesses of the ear-
lier suit and perhaps the attitude of a particular court toward the out-
53. Id.
54. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). While Shutts limited its
holding to actions for money damages, pursuit of such relief is inherent in a suit
under the proposed fiduciary statute. 1d. at 811 n.3. Moreover, even if equitable
relief might be desirable under some unusual circumstance, recognition appears
to be growing in state courts that considerations of fairness and due process make
an opportunity for absent class members to opt out appropriate there as well. See
Kurt A. Schwarz, Note, 68 TEx. L. REV. 415, 432-36 (1989).
55. Section 23(b)(3) allows class actions where a court finds "that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." It
has been suggested that the Shutts Court did not intend to preclude mandatory
class actions under Rule 23(b)(1). See Miller & Crump, supra note 34, at 39, 54.
56. See Vaughter v. Eastern Airlines, 817 F.2d 685, 690 (11th Cir. 1987)(right to opt
out is "available only in Rule 23(b)(3) actions"); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 23.446 (describing suit in Shutts as "common-question class action"). But see
Penson v. Terminal Transport, 634 F.2d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1981)(even though
neither Rule 23(b)(1) nor Rule 23(b)(2) confers right to opt out, court may "man-
date such a right pursuant to its discretionary power"); accord Cox v. American
Cast Iron Pipe, 784 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
57. See Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 300 (E.D. La. 1970); MooRE's,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.31(1)(judgment in class suit brought pursuant to FRCP
23(b)(3) not res judicata as to members of class who opt out).
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reach statute, these shareholders might be able to mount a more
effective action in a more sympathetic jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, however unsettling the prospect of competing or suc-
cessive suits, these appear to present principally hypothetical threats.
Various devices exist for avoiding58 or mitigating59 duplicative litiga-
tion. Further, as a practical matter, the strategy of forum shopping
that might motivate duplicative actions in other contexts does not of-
fer much benefit here. Any states that enacted a fiduciary outreach
statute would obviously share a similar philosophy of directors' re-
sponsibility, thus reducing the utility of pursuing multiple forums. On
the other hand, if one state's courts proved especially favorable to
shareholders' suits, then the desirability of bringing suit there would
undercut the attraction of other forums. The relative meagerness of
shareholders' resources and of individual stake in the outcome-con-
ditions that prompt resort to the class vehicle in the first place-make
it unlikely that plaintiffs would squander those resources on redun-
dant actions promising so little advantage. Indeed, these considera-
tions seem to operate generally to deter the proliferation of class
actions over the same question: the specter aroused by Shutts of an
eruption of duplicative actions does not appear to have materialized. 60
Moreover, any ploy by shareholders to opt out in order to use the
initial class action as a trial run would probably encounter a chilly
judicial reception. Suspicion that shareholders opted out as a cynical
tactic rather than from good-faith concerns about adequacy of repre-
sentation could lead a court to deny certification of the second ac-
tion.6 1 Resistance to certification might be especially pronounced
where the court believed that the shareholders promoting the later
action were acting in concert with those who brought the original suit.
On the other hand, the most likely motivation for shareholders'
flight en masse from an initial class action is also one of the most legit-
imate. If a suit were brought in the state of incorporation and that
state had conspicuously lax fiduciary requirements (a probable reason
for incorporation there), many shareholders--certainly those residing
in states with an outreach statute-would naturally prefer to press
their claims in a more sympathetic forum. Since the very purpose of
the statute proposed here is to provide recourse from insufficient stan-
dards of responsibility, pursuit of an alternative class action under
58. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J.
507, 507-08 (1987).
59. See id. at 516-17, 556-57.
60. See id. at 513.
61. Hostility toward such exploitation of the right to opt out is reflected by a proposal
to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) to curb the ability of those
opting out to rely on an earlier judgment for purposes of offensive estoppel.
American Bar Association Section of Litigation, Report and Recommendations of
the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986).
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these circumstances would represent a valid exercise of the right to
opt out. As long as all departing shareholders migrated to the same
forum, most of the problems of burgeoning litigation would not arise.
While it is true that even a single additional suit compromises judi-
cial economy, the second suit in this case would not be truly duplica-
tive. Rather, assuming that the state of incorporation would apply its
own law to all shareholders' claims,6 2 an alternative action would of-
fer the only means of pressing claims brought under more stringent
fiduciary regimes. If the original action were brought as a derivative
suit as well, a second action for direct recovery could raise problems of
coordination and of allocation of damages; however, these problems do
not appear drastically less manageable in this setting than when a
court must deal with direct and derivative claims in a single suit.
Ultimately, even plausible concerns about administrabiity should
not deter states from venturing the experiment of a fiduciary outreach
statute. If experience were to confirm serious apprehensions about
such legislation, then a state could readily repeal its statute at little
cost. Conversely, experience might well demonstrate the ability of
practical considerations to dissolve adverse theoretical possibilities.
For example, plaintiff shareholders and defendant directors might dis-
cover a common interest in having the class action resolved in a single
forum, perhaps in addition to the state of incorporation.6 3 This mu-
tual aim could induce the parties to cooperate in order to overcome
otherwise seemingly intractable obstacles.
If such cooperation were not forthcoming, however, even the
worst-case multiple suits scenario is not so wholly unthinkable as to
preclude a priori the enactment of fiduciary outreach statutes.64
Shareholder suits under outreach statutes might prove especially ame-
nable to separate statewide actions, with the danger of redundant ac-
tivities minimi ed by coordination of efforts among plaintiffs'
attorneys.65 The various courts involved might agree upon a test case
that would place other proceedings in abeyance.6 6 Finally, the prob-
lem of duplicative litigation might be largely alleviated if a suit under
62. See generally Stern, supra note 1, at 34-44, 60-64 (discussing lenient parameters of
choice of law).
63. For an analysis of the advantages of a single proceeding, see George T. Conway,
III, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J.
1099 (1987). The principal disadvantage of most consolidation, state courts' unfa-
miliarity with other states' law, would probably present little difficulty in the
instance of applying similarly worded and animated fiduciary outreach statutes.
Id at 1105-06.
64. After all, separate defendants in some cases of alleged wrongful injury or death
already face separate suits with potentially inconsistent results.
65. See Miller & Crump, supra note 34, at 71-72.
66. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 758-62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 885 (1974).
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the proposed statute is characterized as not being a Rule 23(b)(3) ac-
tion.67 At least one court has made such a determination in an action
for breach of directors' fiduciary duties, and accordingly refused to
permit shareholders to opt out of the class.6 8
II. THE UTILITY OF A BROADENED SHAREHOLDER
ACTION: EXTENDING THE FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION IN AN ERA OF
DEREGULATION
Traditional notions of negligence in the corporate setting, particu-
larly the business judgment rule,69 embody a deep-seated reluctance
to penalize directors for the harmful consequences of decisions osten-
sibly made in good faith. Moreover, Delaware's adoption of an addi-
tional statutory shield against directors' liability70 and its widespread
emulation by other states7 1 suggest that proposals to increase the pos-
sibility of liability would encounter an inhospitable legislative recep-
tion. Nevertheless, principles of due care, with defensible
modifications, can be incorporated into the proposed statute to provide
a potentially effective mechanism for enforcing directors' duties.
A. Overcoming the Generous Presumption and Standards of Due Care
The application of the duty of care to directors of foreign corpora-
tions does not of course assure imposition of a higher level of responsi-
bility. In addition to making exposure to liability for negligence
mandatory, the proposed statute's substantive standard should hold
some promise of penalizing lapses that might now be committed with
impunity. Accordingly, it should be shown why the statute would of-
fer more auspicious prospects for recovery than traditional actions for
lack of due care.
1. The Business Judgment Rule
At first blush, a practically insurmountable obstacle to recovery in
almost all actions under the proposed statute appears to be presented
by the business judgment rule. Under the rule, directors making a
business decision enjoy a "presumption" that they have "acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
67. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
68. In re Mobile Communications Corp. of Am., Inc., 1991 WL 1392, 16 (Del. Ch.
1991).
69. See notes 77-83 infra and accompanying text.
70. DEL. CODE ANN. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1991) empowers shareholders to insert in the cer-
tificate of incorporation provisions that eliminate or limit directors' personal lia-
bility for breach of the duty of due care.
71. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Directors'Accountability: the Race to the Bot-
tom - the Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171 (1987).
[Vol. 72:905
DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
taken was in the best interests of the company."72 The rule reflects
the philosophy that the structure of corporate governance confides re-
sponsibility for business decisions to management; the limited supervi-
sory role of courts and shareholders does not extend to substituting
their business judgment for that of directors.73 As a matter of policy,
the rule tacitly acknowledges that courts lack the competence to pass
on the wisdom of business decisions,74 and that routine judicial scru-
tiny of the merits of those decisions would chill legitimate en-
trepreneurial risk-taking.75 Applied rigorously, these rationales
potentially confer a virtual blanket immunity on directors for deci-
sions that do not implicate questions of divided loyalty.
Properly understood and applied, however, the business judgment
rule should not bar effective review of board decisionmaking under
the proposed fiduciary statute. While the rule may predispose courts
to uphold the propriety of directors' conduct, it does not in any way
diminish directors' duty of due care. On the contrary, the business
judgment rule does not shield directors who have made" 'an unintelli-
gent or unadvised judgment' "76 or who have otherwise failed to obtain
available information pertinent to their decision.77 The presumption
of regularity dissolves when plaintiffs can demonstrate that the direc-
tors failed to observe the requirements of due care.7 8
Equally importantly, the policies underlying the business judg-
ment rule are less of a concern in transactions covered by the pro-
posed fiduciary statute. While the business judgment rule properly
counsels against inhibiting board deliberations by the constant threat
of judicial second-guessing, the scope of the statute is tailored to avoid
such interference. Because the statute would only apply to major
transactions, decisionmaking by directors would not be paralyzed by
72. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). For an extended review of the
business judgment rule and its application see DENNIs J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusI-
NESS JUDGMENT RuLE (3d ed. 1989).
73. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447,1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989); Rosenthal
v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 353 (Me. 1988); Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33
Bus. LAW. 1595, 1603-04 (1978).
74. See International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447,1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989)(citing
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); Brown v. Ferro
Corp., 763 F.2d 798 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel,
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982).
75. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
See also Marc I. Steinberg, Corporate Governance Generally: Application of the
Business Judgment Rule and Related Judicial Principles-Reflections from a
Corporate Accountability Perspective, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 903, 905 (1981)
AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, §§ 4.01-.03, at 176 (Proposed Final Draft 1992).
76. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (1985)(citation omitted).
77. Id. at 893.
78. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986).
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the specter of constant monitoring of daily activities. Moreover, con-
cerns about providing adequate notice to directors are addressed by
the statutory announcement that judicial scrutiny will only be
brought to bear on major transactions.
More broadly, the types of negligence that directors are most prone
to commit in connection with a fundamental change are more suscep-
tible to judicial review than are ordinary exercises of business judg-
ment. While judges may be ill-equipped to assess the advisability of
selecting a particular product line or the site of a new factory, they
lack neither the ability nor the experience to analyze whether direc-
tors devoted adequate care to a decision deeply affecting the corpora-
tion and its shareholders. On the contrary, enforcing procedural
requirements and fiduciary responsibilities is a matter of peculiar judi-
cial competence.
The capacity of courts to make a meaningful examination of the
quality of board decisionmaking is confirmed by decisions finding a
lack of due care.7 9 When directors act with extreme haste or give cur-
sory inspection to crucial documents, courts can hardly be considered
to have violated their presumptive deference to business "expertise"
by pronouncing these lapses as falling short of the legal standard of
diligence. Lack of business credentials no more disqualifies judges
from gauging the adequacy of directors' care than the lack of a medical
degree precludes juries from returning verdicts of medical
malpractice.8 0
Indeed, the comparison with negligence doctrine in the medical
field suggests that rigid adherence to the business judgment rule may
exaggerate the amount of respect owed to directors' decisions. Unlike
directors, physicians may not even legally practice their profession
without having fulfilled prescribed, rigorous requirements of educa-
tion and training.8 1 This discrepancy in formal preparation may mili-
tate in favor of holding doctors and others with a similarly intense
grounding in their profession to more exacting expectations; however,
it also militates against basing a virtual talismanic immunity on the
putative wisdom of directors. Wisdom is not prudence, and experience
suggests that directors may sometimes lack both.
79. See generally Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty Due Care After Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1988).
80. See W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 188-89(5th ed. 1984); Richard E. Shandell & Patricia Smith, THE PREPARATION AND
TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES § 13.03 (rev. ed. 1991).
81. It is noteworthy that extensive experience in business is not regarded as a sine
qua non for sitting on the board of directors of even large corporations. See W.M.
Fletcher, 2 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 297 (rev. ed.
1990); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.02 (1991); The Role and Composition of
the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, Statement of the Business Roundtable, 33
Bus. LAw. 2083, 2105-06 (1978).
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To some extent, the argument against judicial tampering with an
inviolate sphere of business judgment is undermined by the nature of
decisions typically involved in a fundamental change. When directors
make ordinary decisions, the only question is whether their action will
promote the welfare and profitability of the company. Absent evi-
dence of divided loyalty or conspicuous irregularity, it makes sense to
grant directors a generous presumption that their conduct was
designed to advance these goals.
Neither of the two most probable grounds for judicial questioning
of board decisions-a belief in the court's superior business acumen
and the benefit of hindsight--affords a tenable basis for penalizing di-
rectors for what turns out to have simply been an excusable mistake.
However, when the board's decision concerns a matter on which the
entire future direction of the corporation may hinge, an overwhelming
presumption in favor of the propriety of directors' conduct is no longer
warranted. The very momentousness of the decision magnifies the
consequences of a poorly made decision and hence the value of judicial
scrutiny to ensure that adequate procedures are employed. An appre-
ciation that their conduct may be subject to serious examination, and
not viewed indulgently through the forgiving aura of "business judg-
ment," could prompt directors to act with a due regard for the inter-
ests of shareholders.
A crucial consideration is that these situations characteristically
tempt directors to give insufficient weight to shareholder interests. It
does not require a formal conflict of interest to recognize that concern
for their own position may distort directors' ability to make a careful
and dispassionate assessment of the matter to be decided. In judging
the validity of responses to hostile tender offers, for example, even the
Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged the "omnipresent spec-
ter" that a board might be influenced more by its own interests than
by those of the corporation and its shareholders.82 Accordingly, the
court has reduced the scope of the business judgment rule and in-
creased the role of judicial review in evaluating the appropriateness of
defensive measures. 8 3 Admittedly, such concerns traditionally fall
under the rubric of loyalty rather than due care and may be even less
visible outside the setting of takeover bids. However, as shall be dis-
cussed,8 4 the conventional dichotomy between the duty of loyalty and
the duty of due care offers too simplistic a method of dealing with the
mix of motives and distractions that directors may experience in mak-
ing decisions about a variety of fundamental transactions.
In a sense, close judicial supervision of directors' diligence under
82. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
83. See id at 954-55; see Thomas C. Pelto, Sr., Note, False Halo: The Business Judg-
ment Rule in Corporate Control Contests, 66 TEX. L. REV. 843 (1988).
84. See infra notes 87-174 and accompanying text.
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the proposed statute would further a central purpose of the require-
ment of shareholder approval for most fundamental changes.8 5 That
requirement tacitly recognizes that some decisions cannot be en-
trusted to the normal operation of business judgment. If the question
in mergers and sales of assets were solely one of relative competence,
then the philosophy underlying the business judgnient rule might jus-
tify reposing these decisions exclusively in the board of directors.
However, the requirement of shareholder approval serves not only to
implement tenets of corporate democracy but also to guard against the
possibility that a profound change (or resistance to change) in the cor-
poration will not be unduly influenced by directors' self-interest. Still,
just as shareholder approval gained through inadequate disclosure
does not place a valid imprimatur on a proposed change,8 6 so should
inadequate deliberation similarly taint a board recommendation and
any shareholder decision based upon it. In both instances the magni-
tude of the decision and the vulnerability of the process to abuse
should overcome the normal judicial reluctance to give close scrutiny
to board determinations.
2. The Limitations of Loyalty
In rebuttal to the above analysis, it could be argued that the duty of
loyalty already encompasses concerns about suspect zeal by directors
for the welfare of the corporation and its shareholders. Conversely,
the standard of due care's emphasis on procedural adequacy might be
regarded as too limited a tool for reaching the substantive harm that
lies at the bottom of a suit brought under the proposed statute. Both
observations raise serious objections. Established conceptions of loy-
alty, however, do not address every circumstance in which a signifi-
cant danger of unfairness may lurk. Notwithstanding the apparent
breadth of these principles, courts in practice have tended to confine
breaches of the duty of loyalty to obvious conflicts and severe harm,
while tolerating other injurious but less flagrantly self-interested be-
havior. Between the zone of obviously divided loyalty and that of
egregiously sloppy procedures lies a wide realm in which harmful and
arguably improper conduct may take place. Rather than tolerate such
a permissive concept of directors' autonomy, courts could adjust due
care doctrine to take into account the unfairness of a challenged
transaction.8 7
85. E.g., DEL CODE ANN. 8, § 242(b)(1991)(amendment to certificate of incorporation);
i& § 251(c)(merger or consolidation); id. § 271(a)(sale, lease or exchange of sub-
stantially all of corporation's assets); id § 275 (dissolution).
86. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1970); J. I. Case v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
87. The manner in which due care doctrine might be shaped is described infra notes
182-224 and accompanying text.
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It is true that traditional application of directors' duty of due care
furnishes little ground to perceive it as a powerful mechanism for en-
joining responsible conduct. The relative sparsity of decisions ruling
against directors purely on a theory of negligence underscores conven-
tional judicial reluctance to enforce a stringent notion of due care.88
While Smith v. Van Gorkom8 9 and other decisions in its immediate
aftermath finding director negligence9O might be seen as signaling a
harsher doctrine, each case also involved a conspicuous lack of consid-
ered deliberation.91
At the same time, the greater potency of substantive review under
the duty of loyalty is undermined by limitations on that duty's applica-
tion and remedy. The differing outcomes of two well-known cases il-
lustrate the limited reach of loyalty doctrine. In Globe Woolen Co. v.
Utica Gas & Electric Co.,92 the New York Court of Appeals had little
difficulty striking down a self-dealing contract plagued by "startling"
unfairness 9 3 to one of the corporate parties. The invalidated agree-
ment committed the defendant electric company to supply Globe with
all of the electricity required to operate its textile mills. Under the
disputed provision, Utica guaranteed Globe a fixed monthly saving
over the cost that Globe had previously incurred using steam power.
Largely because of changes in the type of dyeing done by Globe, the
cost of supplying electricity turned out much higher than anticipated;
indeed, Utica ultimately owed Globe money under the guarantee.94
The court's scrutiny of the fairness of the transaction was triggered by
the presence of a Mr. Maynard on both sides of the transaction. May-
nard was president, director, and chief stockholder of Globe as well as
88. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099
(1968)(search for decisions holding directors liable purely for negligence is search
for "a very small number of needles in a very large haystack"); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla
and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 789, 796 (1984) ("twilight existence" of duty
of due care); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Due Care: Judicial
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62
TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983); Larry D. Soderquist, The Proper Standard for Directors'
Negligence Liability, 66 NoTRE DAmE L. REv. 37, 39 (1990).
89. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
90. E.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 2d Cir. 1986); Buckhorn, Inc., v. Ropak
Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), ff'd me., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); Sealy
Mattress Co. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. Ch. 1987); EAC
Indus., Inc. v. Frantz Mfg. Co., 11 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 608 (Del. Ch.), affd on other
grounds, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
91. See BLocK, supra note 72, at 729-44.
92. 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918).
93. Id. at 380.
94. Id. at 379.
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a director of Utica.95 While Maynard did not actively participate in
Utica's approval of the "one-sided" 9 6 contract, the directors who voted
for it were apprised of Maynard's endorsement of the transaction.97
The court's holding that the bargain was fatally inequitable does
not strain even relaxed notions of the requirements of loyalty or confi-
dence in judicial ability to assess the merits of business deals. The
conflict posed by Maynard's dual affiliation was real, not merely for-
mal. Holding the principal shares in Globe and none in Utica, May-
nard had a personal financial stake that lay entirely on one side of the
transaction. Although Maynard neither voted nor spoke at the meet-
ings in which the agreement was considered,98 the other directors'
awareness of his recommendation deeply influenced their own ap-
proval. Maynard must have known of the likelihood that over the
term of the contract (ten years) Globe would adopt changes necessitat-
ing an increase in its demand for electricity and hence making Utica's
fulfillment of its guarantee prohibitive.99 Under the circumstances,
his instrumental role in promoting the agreement and his failure to
warn1 00 his fellow directors of the potentially "disastrous"101 conse-
quences lurking within the guarantee violated elemental obligations
of loyalty.
If it did not require a conception of loyalty with powerful "bite" for
the New York Court of Appeals to relieve Utica of its onerous commit-
ment, the court's later decision in Everett v. Phillips3O2 demonstrates
how weak that bite can be. Unlike Maynard's somewhat restrained
role in causing Utica to accept an improvident bargain, the aggressive
conduct of directors sitting on both sides of the arrangement at issue
in Everett visibly pervaded the entire transaction. There, the defend-
ant directors of the Empire Power Corporation owned or controlled
all of the corporation's common stock and substantial amounts of
other classes of stock, while also owning or controlling a majority of
the common stock of Long Island Lighting Company. The defendants
had Empire make a series of what were ostensibly short-term loans to
Long Island Lighting. In practice, however, Empire repeatedly ex-
tended the time of repayment, 103 so that the arrangement amounted
95. Id. at 378.
96. Id at 380.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 379.
99. See id. at 380-81.
100. See Charles Hansen et al., The Role of Disinterested Directors in "Conflict"
Transactions: The ALI Corporate Governance Project and Existing Law, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2083, 2095 (1990)(characterizing Globe Woolen as "disclosure case").
101. Id. at 380.
102. 43 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1942).
103. Id. at 21.
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to a large, long-term unsecured loan to Long Island Lighting.10 4 At
the time of the litigation, Long Island Lighting still had not paid back
any of the sums that it had borrowed.
The court in Everett rejected the claim of a minority shareholder in
Empire which challenged the directors' refusal to demand repayment
of the loans. Yet, in almost any meaningful sense of loyalty, the direc-
tors improperly subordinated their responsibility to Empire to their
stake in Long Island Lighting. Given the precarious financial state of
Long Island Lighting,105 the subterfuge of indefinitely renewable
short-term loans no doubt served the interests of that corporation and
its shareholders. However, it served no discernible purpose of Empire,
and little serious contention could be made that a director single-
mindedly zealous for Empire's welfare would have displayed similar
indulgence.106 Indeed, this case would have been more sensibly gov-
erned by the flip side of the business judgment rule. Just as an ad-
verse result alone does not permit an automatic inference of
negligence, neither should manifestly dangerous conduct be shielded
by the fortuity that disaster has not yet befallen.
The Everett opinion particularly demonstrates how loyalty's con-
cern with individual motive can distract courts from an appropriate
analysis of fundamental fairness. The court noted that any loss ac-
crued by Empire as a result of the loans would be suffered primarily
by the defendants and that the defendants owned a greater proportion
of Empire stock than Long Island Lighting stock. 0 7 Presumably, the
court cited those facts to establish that the defendants had a strong
financial incentive to avoid actions that could be detrimental to Em-
pire. Such speculation, however, seems ill-advised. The defendants
certainly determined that the magnitude of the loss they might incur,
absent on infusion of loans to prop up Long Island Lighting, was
greater than the harm to which they were exposing themselves by re-
fusing to collect on the loan made by Empire. Simply to state the cal-
culation involved is to show that the defendants' self-interest did not
coincide with that of the corporation on whose board they sat and
whose welfare they obviously slighted.
104. See icL at 23 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 21.
106. Likewise, the court's explanation of Long Island Lighting's reliance on the device
of renewable short-term loans also seems to stray from the perspective of how a
disinterested director of Empire could be expected to act. Issuance of bonds ma-
turing later than one year would have required permission from the Public Ser-
vice Commission, which might have imposed inconvenient restrictions as
conditions to its approval. Id& Again, while evasion of such restrictions was cer-
tainly a relevant (if dubious) motivation for Long Island Lighting's access to
funds, it is difficult to conveive of any advantage that this manauvre conferred
upon Empire.
107. Id at 22.
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In addition, the significance ascribed by the court to one of Em-
pire's charter provisions anticipated a lack of potency in the duty of
loyalty. The provision stated that no transaction with another corpo-
ration "shall be affected or invalidated by the fact that" one or more
Empire's directors or officers had an interest in or connection with the
other corporation.108 The court conceded that the provision did not
immunize transactions in which Empire directors held a "dual posi-
tion" from careful judicial scrutiny.109 Nevertheless, the court opined
that the express authorization to enter into such transactions had "the
effect of exonerating the directors, at least in part, 'from adverse infer-
ences which might otherwise be drawn against them.' "110
The weight accorded to Empire's charter provision in a sense
prefigures Delaware's interested director statute' I and comparable
legislation widely adopted elsewhere.112 Under section 144, a corpora-
tion's transaction with one of its directors, or with another corporation
in which one or more of its directors sits or has a financial interest, is
not voidable solely by virtue of the conflict situation if one of three
conditions is met: disclosure to the board and good faith approval by a
disinterested majority of directors, disclosure to and good faith ap-
proval by shareholders, or fairness of the contract to the corporation.
While the statute on its face is framed in terms of minimum require-
ments for validity, in practice fulfillment of any of the stipulated con-
ditions appears to create a powerful presumption in favor of the
transaction. Delaware courts have held that satisfaction of one of the
conditions imposes on dissenting shareholders a "difficult burden"113
to demonstrate the unfairness of the transaction. Thus, the stringent
safeguard that the duty of loyalty once"14 erected against the taint of
director self-interest has been reduced to what may often amount to a
mere procedural requirement."15 Even if it is psychologically realistic
to expect technically "disinterested" directors to exercise truly de-
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Del. Code Ann. 8, § 144 (1991).
112. See MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.31 (3d ed. Supp. 1986). For a critical view of
efforts to dilute the duty of loyalty see Douglas N. Branson, Assault on Another
Citadek Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Cor-
porate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988).
113. Weinberger v. United Financial Corp., 1983 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. 1983). See Rosen-
blatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619,
626 (Del. 1984); Shreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982).
114. See Harold Marsh, Jr. Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966)(tracing relaxation of rules governing conflict of
interest by directors).
115. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corpo-
rations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1688-1724 (1990)(analyzing movement away from
judicial enforcement of traditional fiduciary duties in close corporations).
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tached judgment,116 Everett suggests the ready accessibility of the
other two avenues for judicial approval. The same majority of share-
holders that installed the board of directors would presumably be
strongly predisposed to ratify a transaction endorsed by the board.
Certainly, shareholder approval is virtually a foregone conclusion .in
instances, like the scenario in Everett, in which interested directors
are also controlling shareholders. 117 In any event, if a showing of
"fairness" can ultimately vindicate any transaction, the conception of
that term embodied in Everett suggests that it poses a meager obstacle
to even highly suspect self-dealing.
Moreover, the cramped notion of substantive unfairness that
courts may harbor does not impose the only constraint on the potency
of actions for breach of loyalty. "Fair dealing," the other principal de-
mand of directors potentially compromised by self-dealing,'' 8 also
calls forth only a limited inquiry, at least in Delaware. For example,
the relevance of tainted motivation for board action has declined, as
evidenced by the Delaware Supreme Court's abandonment of the busi-
ness purpose requirement for mergers.119 More importantly, inquiries
with regard to loyalty have traditionally arisen only out of certain visi-
ble, specifically defined forms of conflict of interest. 2 0 Thus, more
subtle distortions of judgment may not evoke the heightened scrutiny
theoretically triggered by conventional types of self-dealing. A possi-
ble response to this problem would simply be to adopt a more expan-
sive concept of loyalty, but this seems a dim prospect in those states
whose laxity has prompted the proposed fiduciary statute. The same
impulse that moved the Delaware legislature to respond to Van
116. But see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981)(independent
directors appointed to determine whether derivative action against corporation's
directors and officers might be influenced by "'there but for the grace of God go
I' empathy").
117. But see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,221 (Del. 1976)(ratification by majority
of shares held by interested directors does not change burden of proof to demon-
strate fairness in transaction involving interested directors). One obvious solu-
tion to the problem of shareholder bias would be to require approval by a
majority of the disinterested shareholders. See American Law Institute, Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations,
§ 5.02(a)(2)(c)(Proposed Final Draft, 1992). See generally Marleen A. O'Connor,
How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest
Transactions and the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 954 (1993)(examining treatment by Section 5.02 of
directors' duty of loyalty in conflict-of-interest transactions). However, since Del-
aware is highly unlikely to adopt such a requirement, and other states could not
impose it on Delaware corporations, this solution does not appear to be practically
available.
118. Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
119. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 843 (Del. 1987); Weinberger v.
U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
120. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 141-262 (1986).
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Gorkom with section 102(b)(7) makes it unlikely that the state would
otherwise broaden directors' accountability.
Finally, the normal remedies for violation of the duty of loyalty
further underscore the limitations of exclusive reliance on that duty
to protect shareholder interests. Traditionally, courts have held direc-
tors accountable only to the extent that they have benefited from
their self-dealing. Thus, if a director is unfairly enriched by a transac-
tion implicating his personal interest, then either the transaction must
be rescinded121 or the director must reimburse the corporation for the
difference between the contract price and a fair price.122 By contrast,
a director's liability for breach of her duty of due care is measured
strictly by the damages caused by her violation, regardless of whether
she realized any gain by her conduct.2 3 Obviously, then, the sanctions
available for violation of the duty of loyalty carry considerably less
deterrence than those imposed for lack of due care.
3. The Utility of Due Care
Of course, the limitations on the duty of loyalty as a device for fos-
tering responsible conduct do not establish that enforcement of the
duty of care will accomplish that purpose either. Still, the cases in
which directors have been found to have acted negligently underscore
the need for means to hold directors accountable even where self-deal-
ing has not been present or at least demonstrated.124 By countering
through outreach the permissiveness of statutes like Delaware's sec-
tion 102(b)(7), clarifying the presumptive components of due care, and
candidly recognizing a substantive dimension to directors' negli-
gence,1 25 the proposed fiduciary statute would attempt to restore and
improve the effectiveness of the duty of due care.
a. Acknowledging the Existence of Negligence
Fear of prohibitive insurance rates for directors apparently stam-
peded state legislatures into their adoption of various versions of sec-
121. See Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc. 778 F.2d 547, 553 (10th Cir.
1985); Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 727 (5th Cir. 1984);
Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1117 (D.R.I. 1990); Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1191 (Del. 1988).
122. See Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1969); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543
A.2d 348, 355 (Me. 1988); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793,
804 (Ill. 1960); Bliss Petroleum Co. v. McNally, 237 N.W. 53 (Mich. 1931).
123. See Francis v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d 573, 580 n.11 (Cal. 1986)(di-
rectors liable for breach of duty of care regardless of whether they receive com-
pensation for their services); Weidner v. Engelhart, 176 N.W.2d 509, 518 (N.D.
1970).
124. See infra notes 133-69 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 182-224 and accompanying text.
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tion 102(b)(7).126 This reason alone, however, does not seem a
sufficient justification for virtually eviscerating the duty of due
care. 27 After all, skyrocketing physicians' insurance costs1 28 have not
driven states to allow doctors to immunize themselves from malprac-
tice claims.129 At some level, these statutes embody two types of skep-
ticism. The first type reflects a retrenchment of the traditional
interventionist role that state-formulated rules have played in regulat-
ing corporate relationships; this resistance to mandatory rules arises
out of contractual theory and will be addressed later.130 The second
type of skepticism amounts to a repudiation of the Van Gorkom deci-
sion, for section 102(b)(7) effectively overturns the holding in that
case.'31 If the statute had been in effect at the time of the Trans
Union merger, the shareholders could not have recovered for their
losses resulting from the directors' negligence.132 This reversal seems
to represent not only disagreement with the specific outcome in Van
Gorkom, but also a broader lack of faith in the ability of courts to pro-
vide effective remedy for directors' failure to exercise adequate care.
Yet, the circumstances of Van Gorkom and other decisions finding a
lack of due care do not support the contention that courts have lightly
126. See Stern, supra note 1, at 3-4. Of course, competition for corporate charters no
doubt also played a significant role in the usual "race to the bottom." See William
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 666 (1974). However, while keeping up (or down) with Delaware may
have formed much of the immediate stimulus to adopting 102(b)(7)'s counter-
parts, Delaware in turn was ostensibly responding to the specter of spiraling in-
surance rates raised by Van Gorkom.
127. For the view that severe limitations imposed on directors' liability represented an
overreaction to Van Gorkom, see Hazen, supra note 71, at 179-80; Thomas C. Lee,
Note, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and
The Erosion of the Directors'Duty of Due Care, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 239 (1987).
128. See David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis
of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1988); Vi-
nod K. Sahney, et al., Health Care Delivery System: Current Trends & Prospects
for the Future, 34 HENRY FORD Hosp. MED. J. 227, 230 (1986).
129. See Jean A. Macchiasoli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model
Legislation to Cure Judicial .Is, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990); Jeffrey P.
Phelan, Two Hot Areas in Medical Malpractice for the 1990s, 24 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 1261 (1991).
130. See infra Part III.
131. But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98
YALE L.J. 127, 135-40 (1988)(Van Gorkom decision and section 102(b)(7) serve
same purpose of providing boards with means to resist such takeover offers).
132. Since section 102(b)(7) is not self-executing, this conclusion assumes that Trans
Union's charter would have contained a provision shielding directors from liabil-
ity to the full extent permitted by the statute. In light of common practice, see
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.02[7](1992)(widespread adop-
tion of implementing charter amendments); 1 Corporate Counsel Weekly (BNA)
No. 48, at 1 (1987), there seems no reason to assume that Trans Union would not
have elected to have such a provision.
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or irresponsibility determined that actionable negligence has
occurred.
Too much has already been written about Van Gorkoml3 3 to war-
rant rehashing in comprehensive detail the sequence of events there.
To support the proposed statute, which seeks to revive meaningful ju-
dicial enforcement of the duty of care, it seems sufficient to demon-
strate that the Van Gorkom court's holding that Trans Union's
directors breached that duty is eminently defensible. The court's com-
pendious account of the facts reveals that the directors' lapses
amounted to far more than a mere mistake in judgment. As the court
summarized its reasons for concluding that the board's decision to sell
the company for $55 per share could not be considered an exercise of
informed business judgment:
The directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's
role in forcing the "sale" of the Company and in establishing the per share
purchase price; (2) were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company;
and (3) given these circumstances, at a minimum, were grossly negligent in
approving the "sale" of the Company upon two hours' consideration, without
prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.1 34
The court's summary highlights the unnecessary haste that per-
vaded the entire transaction. The meeting in which the court ap-
proved the cash-out merger took place just two days after Van
Gorkom had reached agreement with Jay Pritzker on the proposed
merger and one day after notice of the meeting (but not its purpose)
had been given.135 In approving the sale of the company, the Trans
Union board relied largely upon a twenty-minute oral presentation by
Van Gorkom describing the background and terms of the proposed
merger. 3 6 While the company's chief financial officer volunteered his
opinion that $55 per share lay "'at the beginning of the range'" of a
fair price, 137 no formal valuation study was presented or solicited.138
None of the directors, including Van Gorkom, actually read the
merger agreement before it was signed and then delivered to Pritzker
133. See, e.g., Diedre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, Corporate Real-
ities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union Case, 11 J. CORP.
L. 311 (1986); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985); William Prickett, An Ex-
planation of Trans Union to "Henny-Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL J. CORP.
L. 451 (1985); Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New"
Nor "Bad"Law, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985). For critical views, see, e.g., Daniel
R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437 (1985); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of
Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986).
134. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
135. Id. at 867.
136. Id. at 868-69.
137. Id. at 869.
138. Id. at 868-69, 876.
[Vol. 72:905
DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
hours later.139
The court's careful analysis also refutes the notion that extenuat-
ing circumstances account for what must otherwise be considered neg-
ligent conduct. Admittedly, the board was laboring under a tight
deadline imposed by Pritzker.140 However, even assuming that the
deadline was inflexible,141 this constraint does not excuse the direc-
tors' failure to press for more adequate information in the time that
was available to them. For example, the deadline did not preclude
directors from asking the company's chief financial officer, who was
present at the meeting, how he had arrived at his conclusion that $55
per share represented a minimum fair price.1 42 Nor were the direc-
tors barred from questioning Van Gorkom as to the basis of his own
assertion that $55 constituted a fair price.143
Similarly, the court rejected the directors' contention that the post-
September 20 "market test" cured any risk that the unsubstantiated
$55 figure was too low; under this rationale, the opportunity for com-
peting offers during the ninety-day period of the test would indepen-
dently determine whether the company could fetch a higher price.144
Whatever the merit of this theory, it was undermined by the realities
of the putative "test." To begin with, the evidence that the original
agreement had actually authorized competitive proposals was sketchy
at best.45 Indeed, the agreement explicitly prohibited Trans Union
from soliciting offers and from providing to interested parties infor-
mation that was not already in the public domain.146 Moreover, the
press release announcing the agreement did not signal to the financial
community that the company was up for auction. 147 Under these cir-
cumstances, the court was entitled to find that the market test served
as a meager substitute for a more thoroughgoing examination of
fairness.
Decisions since Van Gorkom finding lack of due care have further
belied any contention that serious negligence on the part of directors
139. Id at 869.
140. Pritzker had insisted that the board act on the merger proposal no later than
Sunday, September 21, which was one day after the board had convened to con-
sider the proposal. Id- at 867.
141. The board did not consider seeking an extension of the deadline. Id- at 877.
142. See id.
143. See id Such inquiry would presumably have disclosed that Van Gorkom had cho-
sen the figure on his own, without consulting financial analysts or other directors,
and that most of the company's Senior Management Group had strongly opposed
the $55 price as inadequate. See id- at 867, 877 n.19.
144. I& at 878.
145. See id. at 878-79.
146. Id at 878.
147. The release stated that Trans Union had entered into "definitive agreements"
with the Pritzkers, and made no mention of the company's right to receive and
accept higher offers. Id. at 879.
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is a nonexistent or inconsequential phenomenon.148 For example, in
Sealy Mattress Company of New Jersey v. Sealy, Inc.,149 Sealy's direc-
tors approved a merger at a fifteen-to-thirty minute board meeting
that included five other important agenda items.150 In "uncritically
accept[ing]"151 the proposed merger price, the directors did not review
or seek documentation to support the fairness of the merger's
terms.152 Among the matters about which the directors "made no ef-
fort to inform themselves of the material facts"153 were antitrust judg-
ments against Sealy whose true value was a "critical factor in any
assessment of the fairness of the merger price."'154 Likewise, other
offers and valuations placing the value of Sealey higher than that re-
flected by the merger price did not enter into the board's calcula-
tions.155 Nor did the board seek the advice of any outside attorney or
investment banker.56 The defendants did cite their position as em-
ployees of either Sealy's parent, Ohio-Sealy, or Ohio-Sealy's parent as
justification for acquiescing in the transaction proposed by Sealey.
The court, however, held that their separate status as directors of
Sealy required that they independently inform themselves with a view
toward protecting the interests of all of Sealy's shareholders, includ-
ing the minority.157
Other cases similarly evidence some board's susceptibility to inex-
cusably sloppy procedures involving fundamental decisions. In
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp. ,158 Fruehauf's board approved an offer for
control of the corporation for apparently less value than other suitors
were prepared to offer and less than would be warranted by the valua-
tion of the company's investment advisor. 59 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the wholesale deference by a special committee
of outside directors to the opinions of management amounted to an
abdication of the directors' fiduciary duty to conduct an independent
review and exercise independent judgment.160 As in Van Gorkom, at
148. For a survey of decisions through the end of 1987 finding a lack of due care, see
Radin, supra note 75, at 728-44.
149. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,331 (Del. Ch. July 20, 1987).
150. I& at 96,678.
151. Id at 96,683.
152. Id. at 96,677.
153. Id at 96,683.
154. Id. at 96,677.
155. Id- at 96,677, 96,683.
156. Id. at 683.
157. Id-
158. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986), affg Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp.
1535 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
159. See Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1538-39 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
160. The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's finding on this point. I& at 1540.
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no time during the brief periodl6 that the directors met to discuss the
proposed transaction did they mount a serious effort to determine the
actual value of the company. 6 2 Similarly, in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc.,I6 3 SCM's board approved an asset lock-up op-
tion at a three-hour meeting without exploring whether the option
price represented the fair value of the two businesses being offered.164
The board did not request an opinion of the range of fair value from
the investment banker that it had retained165 (the firm in fact had not
calculated such values); nor did the directors discuss the impact on
SCM of selling two businesses representing about half of the com-
pany's income.166 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that
these omissions, under circumstances indicating no "emergency need
for a hasty decision... strongly suggest[ed]" a violation of the duty of
due care.167 While Hanson, the optionee's rival in the contest for con-
trol of SCM, had not demonstrated a breach on the order of the Trans
Union board's gross negligence in Van Gorkom,168 the court held that
Hanson was entitled to a preliminary injunction against the exercise
of the challenged lock-up option.1 69
The above list could be extended,I0 but even this brief catalogue
raises deep doubts that judicial vigilance against directors' negligence
could be discarded at little or no cost. Of course, one must respond to
the argument that the post-Van Gorkom cases prove the opposite: that
shareholders do not require the ability to sue for personal damages to
have effective recourse against directors' negligence. After all, cases
like Hanson have been resolved by injunctive relief, which a certifi-
cate of incorporation cannot bar under section 102(b)(7).171 However,
161. Id. at 1538 (special committee met for approximately one hour to evaluate com-
peting offers).
162. See id. at 1539.
163. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'V Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp.
848 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
164. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 781 F.2d at 271.
165. See id. at 268 n.2.
166. Id. at 271.
167. Id. at 275.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 283.
170. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of America v. C.T.S. Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987)(board's adoption of "poison pill" in
immediate response to hostile tender offer, without first undertaking informed
investigation into fairness of offer); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp.
209 (S.D. Ohio), affd mem, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987)(board's adoption of poison
pill without independently assessing, reasonableness of either prices set in poison
pill or of manner in which prices were determined); Mills v. Macmillian, 559 A.2d
1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)(asset lockup option enjoined where board was "torpid, if
not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction).
171. The provision refers only to actions for "monetary damages." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1991). Other state statutes restricting directors' liability are
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the elimination of personal damages seems patently unfair and un-
derdeterrent. The possibility or even probability that a harm can be
averted or ameliorated is generally thought to complement, not sup-
plant, the remedy of damages on those occasions when preventive
mechanisms have failed. So embedded even in corporate law is the
principle that rights imply remedies that damage remedies have been
assumed to reside in securities laws that make no explicit mention of
them.172 When breach of due care by directors involves hasty action
and sketchy information, there is no assurance that affected share-
holders will be able to detect the negligence in time to take effective
action. When the board's proposal becomes afait accompli, plaintiffs
then face many courts' pronounced reluctance to undo a consummated
transaction.1 73 Moreover, since injunctive relief does not adversely af-
fect the position of individual directors, it obviously possesses little if
any of the deterrence value of personal damages.174
b. The Practicality of Specifications
Even granting that legitimate shareholders' remedies should not be
unduly restricted, one might still object to the proposed statute's ef-
fort to reduce the concept of negligence to detailed criteria. This con-
cern should be somewhat mitigated by the statute's intent to consider
the presence or absence of particular procedures as factors to be
weighed, not as inflexible demands straitjacketing director's discre-
tion.175 Directors would always remain able to demonstrate that de-
parture from a prescribed step comported with the fundamental
requirement of due care. 176 Moreover, courts regularly extract spe-
cific guidelines-77 and even rigid rules 7 8 from general statutory direc-
similarly limited. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054(A)(9)(1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4)(1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8)(1988); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (1991).
172. For example, the Supreme Court has implied a private cause of action for mone-
tary damages under section 10(b), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196
(1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,13 n.9 (1971),
and section 14(a), Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991); J.
I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
173. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970)(nothing in policy of
section 14(a) "requires the court to unscramble a corporate transaction merely
because a violation occurred")(citation omitted); Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d
1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1977); Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d
516 (7th Cir. 1973); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp. 72 CIV. 1819-CLB, 1976 WL 813
(D.C.N.Y. July 30, 1976).
174. See Thomas C. Lee, Note, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's
Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 239, 263-69, 274 (1987).
175. See Stern, supra note 1, at 8-9.
176. Cf. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982)(non-price vertical re-
straints may be shown to be legal under Sherman Antitrust Act).
177. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)(construing section 504 of Reha-
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tives; the proposed fiduciary statute would simply spell out the
relevant considerations rather than leave these to judicial inference.
Indeed, statutory specification would remove much of the vagueness
inherent in the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances approach to-
ward negligence and thus reduce rather than increase the chill cast on
directors' decisionmaking by application of the duty of due care.
Still, it might fairly be questioned whether the benefit derived
from prodding boards to adopt more thorough procedures can justify
the intrusive nature of an outreach statute. At one level, this is simply
an empirical question that can only be resolved by experience gained
through enactment of such legislation. If this type of statute proved
counterproductive, it could always be rescinded by the enacting state
or else overridden by federal action. It does not seem convincing to
argue, however, that adherence to the type of procedures proposed
here would inevitably fail to improve the quality of board decision-
making. On the contrary, in the absence of empirical evidence, it
seems intuitively difficult not to believe that more thorough delibera-
tion would have produced better decisions than at least some of those
that courts have held to be the product of negligence. For example,
one does not readily envision Trans Union's directors-assuming gen-
uine devotion to the interests of the company's shareholders179-ac-
cepting Pritzker's offer had they insisted on a plausible valuation of
the company 8 0 or even made sufficient inquiry to learn the dubious
origin of the $55 figure.' 8 ' Similarly, one would not expect Fruehauf's
directors, assuming good faith, to have accepted a bid worth less than
both alternative offers and a reliable valuation of the company if they
had taken the trouble to learn about either of these two pieces of
information.
bilitation Act of 1973); United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIQ-CLC v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979)(construing Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)(construing section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act).
178. See, eg., Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (construing
Sherman Anti-trust Act prohibition of combinations in restraint of trade as im-
posing per se rule against maximum and minimum price-fixing agreement);
United States v. General Motors Corp, 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966)(exclusion of dis-
counters from access to market through joint collaborative action violative of
Sherman Act).
179. See infra notes 195-223 and accompanying text.
180. The inadequacy of the $55 figure is suggested by an offer, made several months
after the meeting at which the board voted to accept Pritzker's offer, to purchase
all of Trans Union's assets and to assume all of its liabilities, for the equivalent of
$60. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985). The offer ultimately
fell through under somewhat confused circumstances. See id at 884-885.
181. Van Gorkom broached the figure to Pritzker, having calculated it by himself
"subjectively," id at 877 n.19, solely for the purpose of determining the feasibility
of a leveraged buy-out. Id at 866, 877.
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c. Incorporating the Substantive Aspect of Due Care
A significant objection to the proposed statute is that there are not
any prescribed procedures that can divert directors bent on acting in a
particular manner. Decisions that insufficiently protect the interests
of at least a segment of shareholders may result not so much from
directors' failure to deliberate and apprise themselves adequately, but
from lack of zeal to safeguard those interests. To the extent that sus-
picion of impure motive forms the real basis of the shareholders' com-
plaint, then arguably they should be confined to an action for breach
of the duty of loyalty. Such claims are neither covered by the pro-
posed fiduciary statute nor barred by section 102(b)(7).182
However, as discussed earlier,S3 the duty of loyalty provides at
best a limited means of ferreting out directors' self-interested behav-
ior and the unfairness that it produces. Realistically, then, it is the
orthodox conception of due care, not loyalty, that would have to be
extended to monitor the full range of directors' inappropriate conduct.
More bluntly, the proposed statute should acknowledge that it is not
confined to the purely procedural concerns conventionally associated
with due care. An egregiously harmful decision should not be abso-
lutely immunized by the appearance of procedural regularity. Rather,
the statute should forthrightly recognize that the criterion of reasona-
bleness in typical formulations of directors' due care1 84 includes at
least some substantive judgment as to the quality of directors'
decisions.185
On the surface, any inquiry into substantive fairness might appear
to be at odds with the proposed statute's exclusion of questions of loy-
alty. In fact, however, substantive assessment of a board's decision
complements the statute's overriding emphasis on the process by
which that decision was reached. The statute is designed to ensure
that directors base major decisions upon ample information and thor-
ough deliberation. Where board decisionmaking superficially meets
these requirements, but still produces a result that manifestly works
against shareholders' interests, it does not strain the core conception
182. See DEL. CODE ANN. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i)(1991).
183. See supra notes 87-123 and accompanying text.
184. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a)(West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a)(3)(1990);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(a)(Purden 1990); The American Law Institute,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Proposed
Final Draft § 4.01(a)(March 31, 1992).
185. One instance where courts already clearly pass such judgment is in their review
of defensive tactics designed to thwart takeovers. Poison pills have been over-
turned where courts have determined that the only reason for the measure was
to simply to stop the raider. E.g., Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Re-
sources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Grand Metropolitan Pub. Ltd. Co.
v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assoc. Ltd., Partner-
ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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of due care to pronounce the directors negligent. For example, if a
board were to decline an offer for the company at $50 per share, in
favor of another offer at $45 per share, then absent compelling circum-
stances a court could hold that the directors did not act "with such
care... as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances." 86 In that instance, the real reason for
the directors' action might well be the presence of an agenda other
than the interests of the prejudiced shareholders, but one that does
not fall under any of the formal headings of self-dealing. Whether the
court suspected improper motivation or not, it would be entitled to
judge the conduct as failing to display the "skill and diligence"' 8 7 ex-
pected of a prudent director genuinely devoted to the welfare of the
corporation and all of its shareholders. Again, such a result would not
render the proposed statute's procedural guidelines superfluous. On
the contrary, the statute is intended to place before the directors all of
the information pertinent to their decision. If they reach a decision
that flies in the face of the obvious import of that information, then a
court enforces a fundamental aspect of due care when it pronounces
them negligent.
Although perhaps a departure from orthodox understandings of
the duty of care, the inclusion of substantive review would not repre-
sent a radical break from the actual manner in which courts apply
negligence doctrine. Rather, open consideration of substantive mat-
ters would bring to light a determination that courts have often tacitly
made under the auspices of procedural analysis. Indeed, the premise
that the board's ultimate decision was substantively flawed is implicit
in almost any holding that directors have acted negligently. For ex-
ample, when the target corporation's board in Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak
Corp.,188 erected defenses to fend off Ropak's tender offer, the court's
ruling that the poison pill was not a reasonable response to the offer 8 9
reflected on the wisdom of the decision itself as well as the board's
mode of arriving at it. The court's conclusion that the directors did
not show that they had exercised due care 90 did center around their
failure to inquire into information "relevant to the assessment of the
reasonableness of the prices set in the poison pill,"'9' thus grounding
the analysis in due care's typical focus on procedural shortcomings. In
effect, though, the court was also rendering a judgment that the
board's valuation of Buckhorn's stock was presumptively exagger-
ated,192 that the directors had apparently harmed Buckhorn share-
186. CAL. CORP. CODE 309(a)(West 1990).
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a)(1990).
188. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), azffd me., 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).
189. Id- at 235.
190. Id- at 231.
191. Id
192. See id. at 230-31.
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holders by purchasing their shares on the open market,193 and that
stock options awarded to some members of Buckhorn's management
did not benefit the corporation.194
Buckhorn also illustrates how the theoretical dichotomy between
due care and loyalty concerns blurs in practice. While upholding some
provisions of the "golden parachutes" approved by the Ropak
board,195 the court enjoined the board's grant of new stock options to
key managerial employees96 as well as its decision to permit accelera-
tion of the chief executive officer's salary and pension if control of the
corporation changed hands and the decision to extend his employment
agreement by six years.197 The court found that none of these quali-
fied as "reasonable measures in relation to the threat posed." 9 8
Although framed as questions of due care, these determinations were
obviously colored by loyalty's apprehension that the directors' actions
were infected by self-interest. Indeed, even the Delaware Supreme
Court has recognized that "the omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders,"199 warrants a more skeptical version of
the business judgment rule when assessing the validity of defensive
measures. 00
In the case of golden parachutes, of course, the potential for per-
sonal aggrandizement is highly visible. In other instances, concerns
about various forms of self-interest have contributed more obliquely
to nullification of board action under the rubric of lack of due care.
These cases suggest that restoring the effective reach of due care, as
the proposed statute would attempt, would redress more than mere
sloppiness. For example, as Dean Clark has pointed out,20 1 the promi-
nent negligence case of Litwin v. Allen2O2 in reality involved more
than the failure of directors of the Guaranty Trust Company to display
adequate skill and diligence. The directors were found liable for ap-
proving the purchase of convertible debentures where the seller re-
tained a six-month option to repurchase the debentures at the same
price that the Trust Company had paid. Liability was based on the
court's determination that the arrangement was "so improvident, so
risky, so unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental
193. See id. at 232.
194. See id. at 216-17, 232-33, 237.
195. Id at 232-35, 237.
196. Id at 233, 237. The court also enjoined amendments to existing stock options that
would have allowed vesting upon change of control. Id- at 233.
197. Id, at 235, 237.
198. I& at 233; id. at 235.
199. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
200. See id. at 955.
201. See CLARK, supra note 120, at 127-28.
202. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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conceptions of prudent banking practice." 203 The court's own account,
however, failed to demonstrate convincingly that the degree of risk
involved fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule.204
Rather, the result is better explained as an objection to the directors'
decision to let the Trust Company absorb the risk in order to avert a
substantial financial setback to the corporation that controlled the
Trust Company.205 Hence, the true defect in the transaction was the
Trust Company directors' suspected lack of loyalty. However, the
available evidence could not establish that the directors had been im-
properly influenced or dominated or had acted in bad faith or in pur-
suit of personal gain.2 06 Faced with conduct that seemed clearly to
violate directors' basic fiduciary obligations, but which did not fall
neatly into either of the principal categories of breaches as tradition-
ally conceived, the court apparently chose breach of due care as the
catchall designation for fundamentally unacceptable but doctrinally
elusive behavior.
Other decisions finding negligence by directors also reflect con-
verging due care and loyalty concerns rather than an exclusive preoc-
cupation with procedural propriety. In Sealy Mattress, as in Litwin,
the inadequate care shown by directors could be largely attributed to
the greater attention given by the board to the interests of the parent
corporation, rather than to the interests of the subsidiary on whose
board they sat. The Sealy directors themselves conceded their lack of
independence, stating that they had "[functioned] in a ministerial ca-
pacity to carry out the parent [corporation's] bidding."207 Similarly,
the "aura of inevitability"208 that surrounded the Frantz board's hasty
decision to transfer treasury shares to the company's ESOP could be
readily explained by the obvious purpose of the move: to overturn
EAC's takeover of the company by diluting the majority control that
EAC had just obtained.2 09 In Hanson, the presence of a "self-inter-
ested management proposing a defensive LBO"210 appeared to in-
crease the court's inclination to conclude that the SCM board's
inadequate deliberations leading to approval of the asset lock-up op-
tion displayed a lack of due care.21 1 Fruehauf, too, illustrates the
203. Id. at 699.
204. See i&. at 691-99; CLARK, supra note 120, at 127.
205. See CLARK, supra note 120, at 127-28.
206. Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 694 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
207. Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 93, 331 at 96,683 (Del.
Ch. 1987).
208. EAC Industries v. Frantz Mfg. Co., WO 8003, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 608, 620 (Del.
Ch. 1985).
209. See id at 620.
210. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 1986).
See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
211. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 1986).
See also Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder]
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sharpened focus that due care scrutiny takes in the context of a man-
agement leveraged buyout. The trial court's holding that Fruehauf's
directors breached their duty of care is laced with considerations of
loyalty: the directors' negligence lay in their failure to review thor-
oughly and dispassionately "management's proposed self-interested
transaction" and in their acquiescence of the use of company assets to
"facilitate management's self-dealing and unfair auction."212
Even Van Gorkom, generally regarded as purely involving a
breach of due care,2 13 hints of the court's unwillingness to ascribe the
behavior of Trans Union's directors merely to well-intentioned inepti-
tude. While the court noted the absence of any allegations or proof of
fraud, bad faith or self-dealing,214 the opinion casts the directors' moti-
vation and character in a light that can hardly be considered benign.
The court's description of the proxy statements soliciting shareholder
approval of the merger paints a picture of guile and deceit: the direc-
tors "cloaked" the absence of crucial information through "artful
drafting" and misled the shareholders through "false and misleading"
shadings of key matters.215 Indeed, the court appears repeatedly to
question the veracity of the directors in rejecting their account of
events. Responding to the directors' seeming contention that a con-
tractual provision for a "market test" excused their failure to assess
fairness in other ways, the court averred that the directors had "no
rational basis" for thinking that such a test was authorized.216 The
directors' assertion that they had "insisted" upon two amendments
permitting a market test was met with similar disbelief.217 Even the
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,617 (Del. 1990). In Freedman, the rejection of a dilution op-
tion by interested directors, although not technically a self-dealing transaction,
was held to be valid only if the directors could demonstrate the transaction's fair-
ness. Id. at 97,888. At the same time, the court found that the company's outside
directors may have acted unreasonably in approving the alternative of a manage-
ment leveraged buyout. Id. at 97,889.
212. Plaza Securities Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 535, 1543 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
See also Kumar v. Racing Corp. of America, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) q 95,896, at 99423 (Del. Ch. 1991)(finding that the "almost ...
perfunctory" board meeting at which merger was approved indicated likelihood
of breach of duty of due care, where court also found that timing of merger con-
stituted unfair dealing).
213. See Deborah A. Demott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Lever-
aged Capitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 544 (1988)(negligence found in Van
Gorkom "uncompounded by self-dealing or evident self-interest in any form").
214. Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). See id. at 889 (indicating
assumption that Trans Union directors acted in good faith).
215. Id at 890-91.
216. Id. at 878. The court also showed little tolerance for the directors' professed reli-
ance on putative terms of the original merger agreement. The directors never
produced the agreement, and the court found "[n]o acceptable explanation" for
their failure to do so. Id.
217. See id. at 879-80.
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directors' version of their counsel's advice at the meeting is called into
question, viewed in the context of directors' claims "made months and
years later, in an effort to extricate themselves from liability."2 18 The
perspective displayed by these passages is especially striking in an ap-
pellate opinion; not only was the court not acting as an original
factfinder but it also had to find the trial court's contrary perceptions
clearly erroneous in order to reach its conclusion.21 9
On the subtle fault line between due care and loyalty, one can also
detect suggestions of doubt about Van Gorkom's own devotion to the
best interests of Trans Union's shareholders. The opinion at least per-
mits the inference that Van Gorkom's conduct was prompted by a per-
sonal agenda. Since Van Gorkom was not unsophisticated about
either business or finance,22 0 it might readily be suspected that the
imminence of his retirement and his social acquaintance with
Pritzker2 21 had more to do with his headlong plunge into the dubious
agreement than a failure to consider the disadvantages of its terms.
Such sources of motivation may not represent typical self-dealing, but
they represent a type of self-interest nonetheless. Because the record
precluded an express attack on Van Gorkom's loyalty, however, the
court instead launched an indirect attack through its implied skepti-
cism of Van Gorkom's proferred explanation for his behavior, espe-
cially his discouragement of competing offers.222 Van Gorkom in a
sense illustrates how the requirements of due care, taking seriously
the question of how a responsible director would act, can reach con-
duct whose indicia of unfairness do not meet the often stringent 223
demands of proof for violation of the duty of loyalty.
Of course, considerations of unfairness should always play a
subordinate role in the examination of claims that directors have
breached their duty of care. An inordinate emphasis on unfair terms
and unfair dealing would undermine key justifications for the type of
outreach statute proposed here: Courts possess peculiar expertise to
assess procedural adequacy, procedure-oriented standards give direc-
218. Id at 880-81.
219. See i- at 864.
220. See id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
221. I at 866.
222. For example, the court noted that while Van Gorkom professed to base his "com-
pletely negative" reaction to a competing offer by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts &
Co. ("KKR") on its financing condition, Pritzker's offer had been similarly condi-
tioned and was still accepted expeditiously. Id. at 884-85. In addition, when KKR
withdrew its offer, it cited the "sudden decision" by the Chief Officer of a Trans
Union operation to withdraw from the KKR purchasing group. Although Van
Gorkom had recently spoken to that officer about his participation in the KKR
purchasing group, he "denied any responsibility for the officer's change of mind."
Id- at 885. The opinion's bland recitation of Van Gorkom's denial leaves the
strong impression that the court does not believe it.
223. See CLARK, supra note 120, at 126.
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tors reasonable notice of expected conduct, and enforcement of the
duty of care does not usurp the prerogative of the state of incorpora-
tion to shape the duty of loyalty. However, as the cases discussed
above indicate, such considerations already subtly enter into determi-
nations of due care. The statute, or perhaps just the jurisprudence
flowing from it, could simply make this analysis more explicit. Also,
as part of the safe harbor rationale for statutory specification of pre-
sumptive procedures, 224 judicial review of fairness should occur on a
sliding scale: The more that a board decision conforms to procedural
norms, the less susceptible to substantive scrutiny it should be.
Finally, even if the proposed statute were confined to procedural
matters in a strict sense, it would still fill a significant void in the cur-
rent regime for enforcement of fiduciary duties. Van Gorkom and
other cases demonstrate that the phenomenon of negligent behavior
by directors, whatever its motivation, is neither nonexistent nor innoc-
uous. Section 102(b)(7) and its counterparts virtually invite directors
to slight the importance of due care. Certainly, other states may be-
lieve that the availability of injunctive relief does not constitute a po-
tent incentive for directors to display the skill and diligence that
shareholders have the right to expect of them. These states should be
entitled to effectuate that belief through legislation that safeguards
the interests of their resident shareholders.
III. REJECTING THE CONTRACT MODEL
The incompatibility of the proposed outreach statute with the con-
tract model of the corporation was noted in the earlier article propos-
ing adoption of the statute.225  Again, contractarians would
undoubtedly view the statute as wrongly disregardful of the share-
holders' agreement to govern directors' conduct by the more permis-
sive regime of the state of incorporation. More broadly, since
contractarians characterize the corporation as essentially a nexus of
contracts,226 they generally endorse the prerogative of shareholders to
determine by compact the rules under which corporate relationships
shall be conducted.27 This section does not undertake a full-scale cri-
224. See Stem, supra note 1, at 8 n.28 and accompanying text.
225. Stern, supra note 1, at 3-5.
226. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Daniel R. Fis-
chel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1261-62 (1982);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976);
Reinier H. Kraackman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Con-
trols, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1984). For an overview of the contract model, see
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Foreward: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989). See generally Symposium, Contractual Free-
dom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, (1989).
227. For rationales of the right to "opt out" of corporate rules prescribed by the state
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tique of the premises and utility of the contract model.228 Rather, it
points to considerations that might persuade a state to adopt the pro-
posed fiduciary statute over objections grounded in contractual
freedom.
A. Countervailing Values
The contract model embodies both an economic theory and a sys-
tem of values. As a matter of analysis, contractarians believe that
market forces will produce rules of governance more efficient than
those imposed by government. They assert that the necessity of re-
taining investors will compel even highly self-interested and formally
unrestrained managers to act in ways that benefit shareholders. 229
Similar logic dismisses condemnation of competition among states for
corporate charters. Seen through contractarian lens, the "race to the
bottom"230 actually amounts to states' healthy effort to develop rules
that are most attractive to profit-maximizing managers (and hence
most conducive to the welfare of shareholders).231
Philosophically, the contract model is rooted in notions of individ-
ual and associational autonomy. Individuals should generally be left
free to pursue their own interest, and to band together on such terms
as they choose for the purpose of maximizing their wealth.232 Ac-
knowledging no independent obligation to place the welfare of others
ahead of one's own, contractarians tacitly disavow the "communitar-
see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Fischel, supra note 226; Daniel R. Fischel & Michael
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 290-92 (1986).
228. For criticism, see, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citader Attempts
to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors,
57 FoRDHAm L. REV. 375 (1988); William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Con-
tracts" Approach to the Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
407 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rheto-
ric of Contract, 85 COLUm. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate
Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure and Moral Values, 69 N.C.L. REV. 273
(1991). Paul N. Cox, Reflections on ex ante Compensation and Diversification of
Risk as Fairness Justificationsfor Limiting Fiduciary Obligations of Corporate
Officers, Directors, and Controlling Shareholders, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 47 (1987).
229. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1419-20 (1989).
230. See supra note 126.
231. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theo-
ries and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 229, at 1420; Daniel Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"Revisited" Reflections
on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913
(1982).
232. See Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field. A
Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1536-38 (1989). See also John C.
Coffee, Jr. The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUm. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989).
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ian ethic"233 of traditional fiduciary law. That ethic empowers the
state to enforce the fiduciary's responsibility never to act for purely
self-seeking ends.234
It is not necessary to refute the economic case for contractual free-
dom in corporate law in order to reject the laissez-faire regime to
which it leads. A state might well conclude that the potential (and
speculative23 5 ) economic benefits of a nonmandatory approach to fidu-
ciary rules are not worth the harm tolerated by that approach in indi-
vidual instances.2 36 The moral imperative of holding directors to a
high standard of responsibility, in and of itself, could justify shielding
shareholders from the consequences of careless board behavior. Fidu-
ciary law has never sought validation in a particular set of economic
assumptions. Instead, the fiduciary's obligation to consider the benefi-
ciary's interest paramount has been regarded as a sufficient good, not
simply the means to fulfillment of a larger economic design.23 7 Poli-
cies that protect shareholders may therefore be understood and up-
held as "rights-based" rather than "utilitarian."238
Thus, the proposed fiduciary statute would continue a tradition
that refuses to sacrifice ethical obligation on the altar of economic the-
ory. Though novel in its reach, the statute simply extends the princi-
ple represented by blue sky laws239 and by the regulation of "pseudo-
foreign" corporations: 24 0 Companies may not rely on foreign incorpo-
ration to evade state policies designed to protect resident investors.
Moreover, this type of statute might test whether the popularity of
nonmandatory rules truly reflects the persuasiveness of contract ideas
233. Coffee, supra note 232, at 1658.
234. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939)(fiduciary's power "may not be exer-
cised for the aggrindisement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the ex-
clusion or detriment of the cestuis"); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939) (holding that fiduciaries "are not permitted to use their portion of trust and
confidence to further their private interests"); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5
(1944) (fiduciary "must subordinate his individual and private interests to his duty
to the corporation whenever the two conflict").
235. See infra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
236. This is particularly true if each such instance is a case where there is an obvious
payoff for short-term violation of the contractual norm, such as where the com-
pany is being sold to others. In other words, the utility and benefits of promise-
keeping in general, in the long run, cannot sustain an argument where the con-
text limits horizons to the short-run.
237. See Douglas M. Branson, Assault on the Citadelk Attempts to Curtail the Fiduci-
ary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
375, 402 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corpo-
rate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989). See
also Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 554 (1846); Patient Care Services, S.C.
v. Segal, 337 N.E.2d 471, 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
238. See Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989).
239. See Stern, supra note 1, at 70-71.
240. See Stern, supra note 1, at 67.
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or instead simply results from the current futility of attempting to im-
pose mandatory rules.241
Nor would the moral priority of the proposed statute constitute a
radical departure from well-established legislative practice. Many
common regulations forego potential economic efficiency in order to
vindicate other values. For example, it might be cheaper (at least to
the present generation, presumably a legitimate perspective in the
self-seeking scheme of contractarians) to ignore long-term environ-
mental degradation, but society addresses this danger out of concern
for the quality of life of its descendants. Similarly, while the elaborate
machinery of antidiscrimination laws may make both business and
government more expensive,24 2 the inherent invidiousness of discrimi-
nation justifies these economic burdens.
In response to these analogies, it could be argued that these and
other24 3 examples pit economic costs against incommensurable nonpe-
cuniary harms, whereas the contract model offers financial gain to the
very shareholders that fiduciary law purports to protect. However,
even regulation that appears to be purely economic in nature is often
designed to achieve other goals as well. The antitrust laws provide
one such instance. It is by no means clear that the Sherman Act's 2 "
insistence on competition 245 invariably produces optimal economic
outcomes. 24 6 Nevertheless, the policy remains intact in part because
the Sherman Act was animated by an aversion to excessive concentra-
tion of power transcending any particular economic theory.247
B. The Decline of Contract
While the above discussion generously assumes the power of con-
241. Companies may currently escape a mandatory rule simply by reincorporating an-
other state that does not impose the rule.
242. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDs (1992).
243. For example, a market solution to dangerously flawed products-relying upon
consumers' rejection to remove them from the marketplace-might entail less
expense than the law of products liability. Likewise, family matters such as adop-
tion might be deregulated and left to private financial arrangements. See RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, SEx AND REASON 409-17 (1992)(proposing free market system for
the sale of parental rights over babies, including elimination of price ceiling on
payment to biological mother to surrender her parental rights over her baby).
244. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
245. See Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 538 (1983); HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLIcy 226-27
(1955).
246. See, eg., Bryan T. Johnson, Antitrust Laws Prevent American Firms from Keep-
ing Pace with the Japanese, Los ANGELES DAILY J., Dec. 24, 1991, at 6.
247. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1227, 1277-79 (1988); F.M. Scherer, The Posnerian Harvest.- Separating
Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974, 980 (1977)(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW AN ECONOInC PERSPECTIVE (1976))(asserting that Posner ig-
nores "diffusion and decentralization of power as end in itself").
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tract analysis, the contractarian prescription for corporate governance
has hardly gone unchallenged.24 8 Even at the level of description, the
contract metaphor has been faulted for mischaracterizing the dynam-
ics of corporate governance. 249 Certainly, a state's adoption of the pro-
posed fiduciary statute should not be barred by any illusions about the
infallibility of the contract model.
In placing the current debate in perspective, it is perhaps worth
noting that the larger concept of contractual freedom has suffered
considerable decline from its zenith early in this century when Loch-
ner250 enshrined "liberty of contract" in the due process clause of the
Constitution.25 1 Though it may be an exaggeration to pronounce the
death of contract,252 faith in the efficacy of unchecked "voluntary"
economic bonds has undoubtedly diminished, as illustrated by the dis-
repute into which Lochner itself has fallen.253 Interestingly, the con-
tract model of corporate governance resembles in a number of ways
the largely discredited conception of contract law inspired by Lang-
dell.254 Just as the orthodox general theory of contract purported to
be scientific in character,25 5 so contractarians pride themselves on the
asserted empirical rigor of their ideas.256 As a corollary, both systems
also base their legitimacy on dubious claims of neutrality and objectiv-
ity. The pretense that the classical theory of contract derived from
discovered principles-as opposed to scholars' and judges' creativity-
was exploded long ago. 257 In constitutional law, the Lochneresque lib-
erty of contract is widely regarded as a product of the justices' eco-
248. See supra note 228.
249. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obli-
gation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1486-87 (1989); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Per-
spective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1449, 1451-57 (1989).
250. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
251. Id at 53.
252. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
253. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14 (1980); Jennifer B. Arlin, Note,
Of Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment: FIRREA's Cross-Guarantee Reex-
amined, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 293, 322-23 (1991).
254. See GILMORE, supra note 252, at 12-15.
255. Id. at 12.
256. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 33 (1990); Fischel, supra
note 231, at 920-21; Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts?
Yet Another Critique of Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1336 (1990); Fred S.
McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field. A Critique of
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1545 (1989).
257. See GILMORE, supra note 252, at 5-53.
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nomic biases rather than a neutral tenet of the due process clause.258
While the contract model in corporate law by contrast enjoys substan-
tial credibility, the contractarians' program nevertheless has been
shown to be decisively shaped by the values that they hold.259
In addition, the Lochner Court's apotheosis of contractual liberty
and contemporary champions of a laissez-faire approach to corporate
governance both assume a type of consent bearing a tenuous connec-
tion to real-world conditions. The bakers in Lochner were presumed
to freely bargain to work the long hours that New York sought to
limit in the legislation struck down by the Court;260 the Court ignored
the practical coercion that compelled these workers to accept such
terms.26 ' In the contractarian paradigm, shareholders are also por-
trayed as having voluntarily consented to whatever license is granted
to directors' behavior by the corporate charter.262 In reality, however,
shareholders of larger corporations cannot commonly be said to bar-
gain meaningfully over the content of charter provisions holding di-
rectors harmless for sloppy behavior; "only rarely would shareholders
know its content and even more rarely would they negotiate with the
director about that content."263
Finally, both the Lochner era and the modern contractarians illus-
trate the danger of elevating a helpful insight into absolutist dogma.
For years the Supreme Court, striking down progressive legislation
addressed to relationships of unequal power,2 64 distorted the valid
premise that our economic system depends mostly on free bargaining.
Today's advocates of almost unlimited contractual freedom in corpo-
rate law ignore the possibility that useful mandatory rules can exist
within a generally consensual regime. Indeed, the contractarian per-
spective itself provides reasons for limiting the ability of corporations
258. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 797 n.5 (1986)(White, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL
POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF Lochner v. New York 162-65
(1990).
259. See Bratton, supra note 228, at 412-32; Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner's Proxis, 48
OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 1005, 1045 (1987). See generally BRUCE AcKERMAN, RECON-
STRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46-94 (1984); William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economic
Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 N.W. U. L. REV. 180 (1992).
260. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57, 61 (1905).
261. See KENS, supra note 258, at 157.
262. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 395, 402-03 (1983).
263. DeMott, supra note 249, at 923. But cf G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corpo-
rate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REV. 517, 550 (1989)(arguing that the likelihood that
shareholders are "equally ignorant" of all provisions of a charter rules it inappro-
priate to invalidate a particular provision because of lack of conscious consent).
264. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)(invalidating minimum
wage legislation for women on substantive due process grounds).
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to opt out of such rules.265 Fiduciary rules present a particularly com-
pelling case for departing from the pure contract model, because
shareholders cannot determine in advance precisely what conduct
they will be authorizing by waiving these rules.2 66 Thus, the proposed
fiduciary statute, while incompatible with notions of unbounded con-
tractual freedom, can be reconciled with a more reasoned approach to
the contractual view of the corporation.
C. The Intrusion of Reality
In considering the proposed fiduciary statute, few legislators would
be likely to immerse themselves in the arcana of economic theory.
Rather, most would probably judge the statute's potential effective-
ness by how they perceive the success of more relaxed restraints on
directors' authority. Given recent abuses, that perception might well
enhance receptiveness to this type of measure. Many legislators, sur-
veying the fallout of misplaced trust in managerial discretion, might
readily reject the contractarians' benign view of the likely results of
directors' self-seeking.
Daily headlines of the past several years provide legislatures with
abundant evidence of the danger of managerial avarice to corpora-
tions, their shareholders, and the economy itself. The massive savings
and loan scandal-unleashed by a deregulatory policy not unlike the
contractarians' laissez-faire prescription 2 67-mocks the contractarian
notion that managers' selfishness is inherently channeled into benefi-
cial behavior. Similarly, huge salaries for executives of highly unprof-
itable corporations epitomize the potential for harm from lack of
managerial accountability. 268 These as well as other examples of man-
agement self-aggrandizement2 6 9 and recklessness,7 0 could persuade
265. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1549 (1989).
266. See Gordon, supra note 265, at 1593-94.
267. See MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST EVER BANK ROBBERY 90-115 (1990); MICHAEL
WALDMAN, WHO ROBBED AMERICA? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE SAVINGS AND
LOAN SCANDAL 19-29 (1990); Fred E. Case, Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in
the Savings and Loan Industry, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (1991); David Maraniss &
Rick Atkinson, In Texas, Thrifts Went on a Binge of Growth, Wash. Post, June
11, 1989, at Al.
268. See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF THE
AMERICAN EXECUTIVE (1991); Leslie H. Gelb, Going Bananas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1992, at A27.
269. See, e.g., BRYAN BORROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR NABISCO 94-96 (1990)(describing corporation president's mainte-
nance of large private aircraft fleet and habit of flying his dog with him around
the country in a separate aircraft); Kurt Eichenwald, Changing the Culture of
Spending at Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1990, § 3, at 12.
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legislatures that shareholders' well-being depends on more than the
discipline of the market.27'
Perhaps contractarians' infatuation with market solutions simply
represents the most recent turn in a long-running historical cycle. Af-
ter all, faith in the efficacy of theoretically free bargaining well pre-
dates even the Lochner era. The position that private agreement
should supersede exogenous standards of fairness can be traced at
least to the first part of the nineteenth century.272 Elegant theory has
proved fallible before, and some legislatures might now prefer fiduci-
ary principles forged by long experience to the latest installment of a
recurring intellectual fad.273
D. The Incentives of the Market
It has been assumed thus far that market theories oppose most
mandatory fiduciary rules and would undoubtedly disapprove of the
outreach statute proposed here. The proposed statute, however, can
answer at least some of the reservations that contractarians raise
against government interference with market forces. For example,
some contractarians note that few corporation laws can be regarded as
270. See, e.g., Kathy M. Kristof & Victor F. Zonaan, First Capital Rose Fast Sank
Faster, L.A. TIMEs, May 11, 1991, at D1 (excessive purchase of "junk bonds"); Scot
J. Paltrow, Executive Life Seizure, L.A. TIMES, April 12,1991, at D1.
271. Ironically, these examples suggest that the underlying logic of the Coase Theo-
rem, a pillar of contract theory, can be turned against contractual freedom. The
Coase Theorem posits the futility of legal rules that obstruct what those governed
by the rule regard as the most effective arrangement between them. Under the
theorem, parties will simply devise a means other than that forbidden by law to
attain their desired end. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKEs, MORALS AND THE
LAW 67-81 (1988); Glenn W. Harrison & Michael McKee, Experimental Evalua-
tion of the Coase Theorem, 28 J.L. ECON. 653 (1985); James Lindgren, "01' Man
River ... He Keeps on Rollin' Along". A Reply to Donohue's Diverting the
Coasean River, 78 GEO. L.J. 577 (1990). In the corporate context, contractarians
note that managers can defeat governmental restraints on their ability to achieve
personal gain by rewarding themselves through other provisions. See Easter-
brook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 1433. However, the same ingenuity that en-
ables parties to circumvent rules thought to be inefficient can also be employed
for less noble purposes. The examples above suggest that in the real world-as
opposed to the contractarians' Ponglossian universe of managers' advancing their
fortunes solely by improving their company's position-neither legal rules, con-
tractual arrangements, nor the good of the corporation stands in the way of many
managers' drive for personal enrichment. Therefore, legislation like the pro-
posed fiduciary statute may appeal to legislatures as a way to redress inevitably
inimical behavior.
272. See MORTON HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AmRICAN LAw, 1780-1860, 209-
10 (1977).
273. See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703,1726-46 (1989)(asserting that old, fundamental prin-
ciples like fiduciary duties entitled to considerable deference in face of clever
academic critiques that may lack some connection to actual experience).
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effectively mandatory in light of the availability of reincorporation
and offsetting charter provisions.274 Through its outreach provision,
however, the proposed statute would drastically reduce the ability of
directors to evade the statute's enforcement of a meaningful standard
to due care.275 More importantly, the statute avoids contractarians'
objection to the expensive machinery of regulatory oversight.276 Here,
"[t]he expensive legal system is not cranked up unless there is evi-
dence of wrongdoing" 277-a form of deterrence accepted by con-
tractarians in at least some contexts.278 Moreover, that benefit can be
magnified by confining the proposed statute to clear and substantial
showings of directors' breach of the duty of care.
Ironically, evidence exists that the market itself does not view
stringent enforcement of fiduciary duties with automatic disfavor. On
the contrary, one study279 of the aftermath of Van Gorkom disclosed a
reaction at odds with contractarian premises about investor behavior.
If shareholders truly prefer lax fiduciary restraints for which they
have formally bargained to externally imposed stricter rules, then
Van Gorkom should have undermined the appeal to investors of Dela-
ware corporations. Conversely, the enactment of section 102(b)(7)
should have restored the investor confidence that Van Gorkom pre-
sumably impaired. In fact, the correlation between those events and
market value turned out the opposite of such piedictions. The study
found that Van Gorkom was not followed by a decline in the value of
Delaware corporations, 28 0 whereas the relative value of Delaware
firms did drop significantly around the time that section 102(b)(7) be-
came effective. 28 1 Moreover, Delaware firms that amended their arti-
cles of incorporation to confer the protection authorized by section
102(b)(7) suffered abnormal losses during the period studied.28 2 While
hardly conclusive, this evidence suggests that investors, whose sover-
eignty contractarians exalt, might welcome rather than resent legisla-
tion like the proposed fiduciary statute.
274. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for
Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599, 1599-1602 (1989); supra note
271.
275. Of course a corporation could simply refrain from doing business in states passing
such legislation. Cf. Stern, supra note 1, at 25-26 (avoiding state's exercise of ju-
risdiction over directors by barring sale of corporation's shares in that state).
Widespread adoption of the statute, however, would impose significant limita-
tions on the utility of this strategy.
276. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 1421.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Michael Bradley & Cindy Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard
in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1989).
280. Id. at 57-59.
281. Id. at 60-61.
282. Id. at 61-65.
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In a larger sense, too, the proposed statute does not inherently
clash with the operation of the market. Employed judiciously, govern-
ment requirements can refine rather than impede market efficiency.
For example, although some laissez-faire proponents have defended
insider trading,28 3 laws banning such trading have been widely en-
dorsed as fostering free and orderly markets and investor confi-
dence.28 4 Disclosure requirements also invigorate the market by
providing potential investors with a fair opportunity to assess the pros-
pects of their transactions.285 The proposed fiduciary statute would
further the broader aims of these laws, assuring investors of recourse
should directors' irresponsibility disrupt the proper function of the
market.286
E. The Interests of Federalism
Contractarians' insistence on respecting the bargain that share-
holders have struck in their charter dovetails with others' objection
that extending domestic corporate law to foreign corporations vitiates
the shareholders' selection of another state's corporate code.28 7 Thus,
proponents of the contract model can invoke the principle of federal-
ism,288 or at least a version that defers to the sovereignty of each state
within its sphere. There are, however, other visions of federalism into
which the proposed fiduciary statute comfortably fits.
To begin with, federalism's conception of institutional competence
does not apply to the proposed statute. A major justification of feder-
alism propounded by its earliest defenders is that states are inherently
capable of performing some functions more effectively than the na-
tional government. 289 The current patchwork of state-prescribed fidu-
283. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis
W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 857, 868, 879-71 (1983); Hsiu-Kwang Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 CoLuM. L. REv. 260, 269 (1968).
284. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976);
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 411 U.S. 582, 591 (1973);
Daniel L. Goelzer, Introduction, Symposium on Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1984); Martha M. Hamilton & Peter Behr, Is the SEC Big Enough for
the Job?, WASH. POST, May 25, 1986, at Fl.
285. See 113 CONG. REC. 24, 664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
286. Outside the securities area, antitrust laws, by preserving the conditions of compe-
tition, also promote a free market through regulation. See Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1-7 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
287. See State v. Great Northern-Chan Restaurant, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Ohio
App. 1982).
288. For a discussion of federalism, see Andrzej Rpaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341.
289. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 576-77
(1985)(Powell, J., dissenting); JESSE H. CHOPER, JuDIcIAL REvEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLmcAL PROCESS 248 (1980); THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (James
Madison)(Clinton Ressiter ed., 1961).
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ciary duties, however, does not reflect a reasoned determination that
this scheme is more efficient than a uniform federal standard. Rather,
it simply arises from the historical accident of state predominance in
the chartering of corporations in this country.29 0 This fortuity aside, a
federal regime of corporate law, particularly fiduciary duties, would
serve needs unfulfilled or undermined by the present system.2 91 Real-
istically, of course, the federal government is unlikely to undertake
such regulation.292 The lack of federal involvement, however, high-
lights the proposition that the present allocation of authority is not
mandated by a principled concept of federalism, but springs largely
from inertia and self-interest. These forces do not justify rejecting the
proposed fiduciary statute simply because it upsets the prevailing sys-
tem of deference to the lex incorporationis as the "font"293 of direc-
tors' powers and duties.
Assuming the continued lack of a federal role, the question re-
mains whether the proposed statute upsets the proper balance of au-
thority among co-equal state sovereignties. As has already been
demonstrated, the statute would not violate limitations imposed by
constitutional and choice-of-law requirements. 294 Even from an equi-
table standpoint, however, the statute would not unduly encroach on
290. See Cary, supra note 126, at 663-68. See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BusINEss CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
1780-1970 13-57 (1970).
291. See RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTIrUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE
FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); Cary, supra note
126, at 696-702; Stanley A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Pol-
icy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 481 (1968).
292. In construing federal legislation affecting duties to shareholders, the Supreme
Court has consistently favored deference to state corporate law where the statute
does not expressly preempt state standards. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
478 (1979)(federal courts to apply state law governing authority of independent
directors to terminate derivative suits to extent permitted under Investment
Company Act and Investment Advisers Act); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 479 (1977)(stating reluctance to "federalize" corporations law dealing
with transactions and securities and refusing to apply substantive "'federal fidu-
ciary principle'" under Rule 10 b-5); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)(state law
to govern internal affairs of corporation except where "federal law expressly re-
quires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders"). See also
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). Accordingly, assump-
tion of federal responsibility for promulgating fiduciary rules would require an
explicit congressional enactment. The political forces that could be expected to
mobilize against such legislation, however, probably form an insurmountable ob-
stacle. See William L. Cary, supra note 126, at 700; James William Hurst, Re-
marks, Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing Standards of
Conduct for Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 1185, 1191 (1976). The intense
stake in charter fees alone, by those states that reap a substantial profit from
incorporation, would probably trump the more abstract interest in uniformity
and efficiency.
293. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
294. See Stern, supra note 1, at 34-60.
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the appropriate prerogatives of states of incorporation. It is true that
extending the reach of stricter fiduciary standards would reduce the
attraction of states like Delaware as havens of permissiveness 295 and
hence threaten revenue from incorporation fees. It is equally true,
however, that the option of reincorporation deprives states wishing to
adopt higher standards of that same business. No neutral principle
rooted in the benefits of federalism ratifies the superiority of the pre-
vailing system, under which other states are practically compelled to
emulate Delaware's laxity to avoid losing charters.296
More positively, the proposed statute might serve loftier purposes
of federalism by filling gaps left by federal reticence. The lack of sub-
stantive fairness requirements in the federal scheme of securities reg-
ulation,297 for example, invites states to develop such standards
themselves. The statute represents one way in which states could in-
crease their responsibility for the integrity of the market. If widely
adopted, the statute might even eventually provide ordinary investors
with protection similar to that received by consumers under the doc-
trine of unconscionability.29 8
The ultimate aim of the proposed statute, however, is not simply to
redress failure to act with sufficient care, but to prevent it. Ideally,
the existence of outreach statutes would deter the sort of board lapses
now effectively condoned by section 102(b)(7). Perhaps the enforce-
ment of fiduciary obligation would inspire corporate boards' own "race
to the top" to demonstrate the most responsible behavior. Indeed,
even contractarians do not argue that shareholders would not benefit
from directors displaying what is generally considered due care.
Rather, they contend that government mandate of such conduct does
not warrant the costs that regulation allegedly exacts.
While it is conceivable that the contractarians are right and that
the proposed fiduciary statute would not accomplish its aims, this can-
not be known unless legislation actually passes. Even failure of the
statute, however, would vindicate a core value of federalism. The re-
tention of significant powers in the states not only prevents dangerous
295. There are other reasons, however, why states might still prefer to incorporate in
Delaware. See id- at 55 n.309.
296. Admittedly, some of the appeal of an outreach statute might lie in special advan-
tages that the statute might confer on the enacting state and its residents. Most
obviously, a successful suit would effectuate the transfer of wealth from directors
to shareholders in the forum state. In addition, the prospect of recourse for negli-
gence might encourage investment by residents of the state, thus increasing rep-
resentation from that state within numerous corporations. Again, though,
however self-seeking these motives, they do not threaten the assumptions of
federalism.
297. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
298. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (1971).
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accumulation of power in the national government;29 9 it also enables
states to act as laboratories for the trial of innovative legislation.300
Since the regime dominated by section 102(b)(7) and its imitators has
hardly been shown to be a resounding success, the different approach
of a fiduciary outreach statute deserves its turn in the caldron of state
experimentation. The contractarians, so proud of their scientific
rigor,301 should not object to a fair test of this novel kind of corporate
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without question, the proposed outreach statute would represent a
notable departure from prevailing notions of directors' accountability.
Because of the statute's novelty, it is easy to exaggerate the difficulties
and drawbacks in enforcing such legislation. While these obstacles are
not illusory, neither are they insurmountable.
The multistate class action envisioned by passage of several out-
reach statutes cannot be regarded as inherently unmanageable. On
the contrary, the fears after Shutts that this type of suit would inevita-
bly generate intolerable costs and unfairness appear not to have been
realized. As Part II demonstrates, there is nothing peculiar to share-
holder actions under the proposed legislation that would preclude
states from conducting them in an orderly fashion as well. In particu-
lar, the specter of duplicative litigation fades upon closer
consideration.
Legitimate concern that the duty of care is not adequate to the task
of fostering responsible behavior by directors is rooted in widespread
legislative and judicial reluctance to enforce meaningful standards of
due care. By the very act of passing the proposed statute, however, a
state would signal its resolve not to be bound by a crabbed sense of
fiduciary obligation. Legislative adoption would reverse the eviscera-
tion of shareholder remedies for negligence wrought by section
102(b)(7) and comparable statutes in the wake of Smith v. Van
Gorkom. Moreover, an outreach statute could instruct courts not to
apply the toothless version of the duty of care thought to prevail in
fiduciary jurisprudence. Rather, courts could follow the example of
those decisions recognizing that review for due care entails more than
a virtual rubberstamp under the aegis of judicial deference to direc-
tors' expertise. In particular, the statute could authorize candid appli-
299. See Rapaczynski, supra note 288, at 388-89.
300. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 582 (1981); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 376 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 310-11 (1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Be-
tween State and Federal Law, 54 CoLuM. L. REV. 489, 493 (1954).
301. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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cation of substantive standards long implicit in the concept of due
care.
Finally, while it is likely that few legislators would ground their
resistance to the proposed statute in'conscious adherence to the con-
tract model of corporations, contractarian commentary has contrib-
uted significantly to widespread skepticism toward such interference
with shareholders' "voluntary" agreements. Accordingly, Part III has
sought to show that the contract model does not provide an infallible
guide to corporate governance. On the contrary, both normative and
empirical grounds exist upon which a state might choose to enforce
mandatory fiduciary duties against directors who deal with its resi-
dents. Indeed, in some ways, contractarians' own premises about mar-
ket behavior and about the superiority of experience to abstraction
support experimenting with the proposed outreach statute.
The issue ultimately raised by the proposed statute is whether the
current relaxed regime governing directors' duties in fact maximizes
the welfare of shareholders. Enough evidence exists to the contrary to
warrant trying to impose accountability. Little lasting harm seems
likely to result should outreach legislation fail to achieve its aim,
whereas success might bring substantial benefits, not the least of
which would be a revived interest in the responsibility of direcfors.
1993]
